


MILITARY AFFAIRS

Vol. XI, No. 1 Spring 1947



AIRMAN SPAATZ



EDITORIAL

Military Affairs commences its second decade of publication with a new Editorial Board and a modified format, but with as vigorous a determination as ever to present the best in military articles of opinion and historical studies.

The new board has been selected to furnish both functional and service spread. From the Navy is Lt. Comdr. Robert M. Lunny, assistant to Dr. Robert G. Albion in the Office of Naval History; Dr. Albert F. Simpson, Chief Historian of the Army Air Forces Historical Division is another member. Lt. Col. Jesse S. Douglas, former managing editor of *Military Affairs* and long associated with the Institute, is with the Historical Section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Frederick P. Todd, Col. Inf-Res., one of the founders of the journal and also a trustee of the Institute, is engaged in work with the War Department Historical Division. Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Col. Inf-Res., who will head the *Military Library* department, is well known as Chief Historian of the WD Historical Division. Capt. William M. Mettler, former art director for *Air Force* magazine, is the designer of the new cover and will oversee the artistic content of the journal.

The Editor and the Editorial Board cannot alone furnish you with the magazine you desire. The aid of every member is required—aid by being a member, aid by suggesting other members and subscribers, aid by contributing articles, notes and illustrations, and, finally, aid by criticizing the content of the journal. *Military Affairs* is the only magazine in the United States which is devoted entirely to the study of military history. We must be proud of that responsibility and fulfill the attendant obligations effectively.

MILITARY AFFAIRS

The Journal of the American Military Institute

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SPRING 1947

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COVER: Carl Andrew Spaatz became Commanding General of the Army Air Forces thirty years after he attended flying school. He first decided to become a flyer in his plebe year at West Point when he saw Glenn Curtiss flying down the Hudson in a biplane on the historic flight from Albany to New York City. As a flight leader during World I he was officially credited with shooting down three German Fokker planes, and in 1929 commanded the Army plane "Question Mark" which kept aloft for a record of 150 hours. He was appointed Commanding General of the Army Air Forces in Europe in 1942 which was in addition to his duties as commander of the Eighth Air Force. He was nominated to the top post of the Army Air Forces upon the retirement of General of the Army Henry H. Arnold in February, 1946. General Spaatz was present at all three signings of surrender by the enemy at Rheims, Berlin and Tokyo.

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EVOLUTION OF AIR POWER

Our Urgent Need for an Air Force Second to None

BY GENERAL CARL SPAATZ

The year 1783 saw the first aerial ascent by man. The vehicle was a balloon, and it is strange that the military minds of the day failed to perceive in it an adjunct to their weapons of war possessed of unlimited possibilities. Andre Giraud de Vilette, the first passenger in a captive balloon, wrote to the *Journal de Paris* on October 20, 1783, that he "was convinced that this apparatus, costing but little, could be made very useful to an army for discovering the positions of its enemy, his movements, his advances, and his dispositions." Despite this clear statement of the obvious, the value of aerial reconnaissance was not fully recognized until 1914. It is a curious commentary upon the genius of Napoleon to note that he abolished the French Army's balloon corps which had been allowed to run to seed after a promising beginning during the French Revolution. If there had been a balloon observer at Waterloo, the period in history known as the Hundred Days might have ended at Versailles instead of St. Helena.

The Civil War in the United States was marked by aeronautical activity in both the Union and the Confederate armies. The direction of artillery fire by balloon observers, the employment of anti-aircraft artillery, the use of camouflage, and the erection of faked gun emplacements anticipated developments which were not to be made standard proce-

dures in the military establishments of the world until much later. Despite such advanced operations, the Civil War use of balloons was very limited, and they were discontinued long before Appomattox. The Franco-Prussian War, which followed in 1870, made practically no military use of balloons. The French, however, did dispatch 65 from beleaguered Paris to carry mail and important personages, including Premier Gambetta, who escaped to prolong for a short time the war his country had already lost.

Although many military opportunities were missed during the nineteenth century through the failure of the armies to use aeronautical aids to reconnaissance, surface scouting continued to be capable of giving reasonably accurate intelligence until the mass armies, increased mobility, and increased firepower which came into being during the pre-World War I era rendered it inadequate. When trench warfare stopped all mobility of maneuver on the Western Front it came as something of a surprise to the strategists who, before 1914, had pictured the coming conflict as a war of movement. In anticipation of shifting encounters a substantial amount of military attention turned from balloons to heavier-than-air machines and guidable lighter-than-air machines of the semi-rigid or dirigible type. The great names of Wright, Farman, Curtiss, Rumpler, Zeppelin, and

Schutte made international news during the first dozen years of the twentieth century, and as a result of the interest generated in aviation by their early experiments, the belligerents of 1914 entered the war with aircraft capable of functioning as instruments of strategic reconnaissance.

AIR POWER DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD WAR I

It is unfortunate, from the standpoint of the military development of air power, that World War I was a war of movement for but a short time, and that freedom of maneuver ended when the Allies in the west faced the Central Powers along three hundred miles of trench work which stretched from Switzerland to the English Channel. As strategic reconnaissance, aviation in World War I enjoyed an independence which, had it continued, might well have hastened the maturation of the concept of air power as a co-equal military arm which operates most effectively, either as a tactical or strategic force, when organized as an autonomous entity under a supreme commander of all of a theater's military power. It was inevitable however, in view of the primitive nature of air power in 1914, that aviation should be made to subserve the ends of the land armies after trench warfare had removed the need for strategic reconnaissance and had placed a premium upon the observation of artillery fire and the performance of tactical reconnaissance. The stalemate which continued for years on the ground, and the slow campaign of attrition carried on by the naval forces blockading Germany set the stage for either side to win the decision through strategic air bombardment. Neither the Allies nor the Central Powers, however, possessed air equipment which would have been capable, by any stretch of the imagination, of carrying out

such a mission. Supplying information to intelligence and staff officers became the routine tasks of the airmen, and the designation of "division aviation" was to be applied to aviation units almost to the time of World War II.


As the eyes of the armies, aviation was very successful. For the first time since the development of mass land forces the "fog of war" lifted and commanders were able again to make decisions upon the basis of an observable situation. The result was increased fighting efficiency, but since almost throughout the war neither side won any clear cut aerial superiority the benefits of aviation accrued about equally to the opposing armies. Aviation, however, gave an unexpected advantage to the Entente powers through improving the efficiency of surface weapons and increasing the daily expenditure of the materials of war. The rate of attrition was stepped up, adding to the effectiveness of the Allied blockade and increasing the importance of the superior productivity of the factories of England and the United States.

As the conflict proceeded the performance of aircraft improved under the forced developmental programs imposed by war conditions. Single seater planes became sturdier, faster, more maneuverable, and far better armed. The scout plane developed into a true fighter type. Yet although the mission of the scout was armed reconnaissance, its frequent participation in spectacular individual sky duels made it the object of world attention, and the tabulations of enemy aircraft destroyed did help morale, but in truth there was as much of a stalemate in the air as there was on the earth below. Aside from increasing the rate of attrition, aviation in World War I merely added a third dimension to the area practicable for hostilities and made but slight contribution to the ultimate decision.

GOTHA ATTACKS ON LONDON

The dirigible attacks on London were strategic in concept, and during a three-year accelerated campaign, the Belgian based airships struck at targets throughout England with considerable effectiveness. At the height of the Zeppelin and Schutte-Lanz activity as many as a quarter of a million Londoners sought nightly refuge in the city's underground. But the development of improved fighter aircraft, and the advent of the tracer bullet put an end to this German attempt to break the stalemate in the air. The Gotha, a long-range bomber which had been given its operational trials in the Balkans, took over the Zeppelins' mission, and in May, 1917, London was attacked in daylight by a formation of them. Despite their limited capabilities, the Gothas were able to continue their raids with some degree of success, and, in addition to disorganizing life in England's capital an appreciable amount, drew upon Allied air strength in France which had to provide the necessary air defense.

Allied air equipment had been developed almost exclusively to perform the duties of reconnaissance and observation. Although there was a growing awareness, fostered by air leaders like Brigadier General William L. Mitchell of the United States Army Air Service and General Sir Hugh M. Trenchard of the Royal Flying Corps, of the need for strategic air equipment it was only in the last year of the war that any appreciable strategic bombardment was done by the Allies. Although some good results were obtained, particularly by the British Handley-Page bombers against Mannheim and Frankfurt, equipment limitations hampered Allied operations as it did the German. The best heavier-than-air bombardment aircraft of World War I were able to drop but half a ton of explosive on a target, and most bombers were capable of carrying but a few hundred pounds for



The C-82 "Packet" demonstrates the new method of paratroop jumping whereby soldiers leave the ship by two's.

short distances. The numerous bombing raids which were flown during the conflict had little effect on its outcome. The great land armies and the naval blockade decided the issue.

In America aviation was a highly controversial subject during the two decades which separated World Wars I and II. The test bombing and sinking of the "Frankfurt" and the "Ostriedland" began the air power versus sea power debate that continued unresolved until the events of the recent war. The struggle for appropriations for military aviation went on from year to year ending only with the direct threat of World War II. Against the firm convictions of the Army Air Service leaders who believed that strategic bombardment would be decisive in a future war the President's Aircraft Board headed by Chairman Dwight W. Morrow reaffirmed, in 1925, the status of military aviation as subservient to the needs of the army. In 1934, only ten years before Japan was to be bombed by B-29s, the War Department Special Committee on Army Air Corps with the Honorable Newton D. Baker as its chairman envisaged our primary needs in land based aviation as "... adequate air forces with our army to assist in repelling an invading force, which the Navy does not overcome, and to assist in land campaigns." But by providing material for speculation and further debate on the role of air power the wars in China, Abyssinia, and Spain intensified the pro and con discussions.

MILITARY AIRCRAFT IN ETHIOPIAN CAMPAIGN

In 1935 Italy marshalled the power of a modern military nation against the feeble defenses of feudal, primitive Abyssinia. The campaign was essentially political, and Mussolini could not risk a failure. Instead of the 120,000 troops with which Marshal

Emilio De Bono had expected to operate, Il Duce ordered the campaign to be executed with ten Italian divisions. When De Bono had received 126 of the 350 aircraft he had calculated as necessary for the support of his ground forces, the Italian Army, on October 3, 1935, began its advance against the Negus. In November De Bono was replaced by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, and by the second week in May, 1936, the Ethiopian Empire had been defeated. Although the poorly equipped and ill trained Ethiopians presented to the Italians an opposition which can hardly be described as formidable, the logistic problems in the campaign were substantial, and the nature of the terrain made maneuver and liaison extremely difficult. In view of the obstacles to an early victory, the ability of the Italians to conclude the Ethiopian Campaign in eight months represented a considerable military achievement.

But to the man in the street the Italian victory did not appear as an impressive performance at all. He felt that the Italian bombardment and attack aviation should have been quickly decisive against a foe whose only air defense at the outset of the war consisted of 24 anti-aircraft cannon and 12 inefficient airplanes. When the fighting continued for three quarters of a year the debunkers of air power won many converts to their cause.

In the eyes of objective military observers, however, the Italians used their aviation very well. There was literally no strategic bombing mission in Abyssinia, and there was very little need for independent air activity. Since its task was purely tactical and cooperative in nature the Italian Air Force was not hampered in its operations by its subordination to the ground forces. Good organization prevented air units from being used in an inefficient and piecemeal fashion, and what independent action the Italian Air Force



Maj. Gen. Kenneth B. Wolfe, Commanding General of the 5th Air Force, Occupation Air Force in Japan.

did undertake was merely the bombardment of tactical targets which had been located by aerial reconnaissance and attacked upon Air Force initiative. While aviation was used in Abyssinia in much the same manner as it had been used in World War I, the ease with which the Italian victory was achieved was largely the result of the lack of opposition to aerial reconnaissance. Those onlookers who condemned air power as relatively ineffective did so because they committed the folly of thinking that the Ethiopian Campaign presented a parallel situation to what would obtain in a war between industrial powers.

Shortly after the Japanese began the Battle of China, in July, 1937, Japanese bombers attack over a wide area. The targets were commercial and industrial centers, and the Japanese purpose was to destroy Chinese production and to break the will of the population to resist. It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of these attacks since they were not sustained long enough to have a measur-

able impact upon the conflict. It is easy to surmise, however, that the Japanese air units operating in China were brought to heel by the ground commander in charge of the campaign and henceforth restricted to tactical operations. This surmise becomes even more plausible when it is seen that the subsequent Japanese use of aviation in China prior to 1940 was as an afterthought to unsuccessful or indecisive action. Japanese troops had fought for three bloody months before Shanghai fell on November 13, 1937. When air power was finally used, the Chinese retreat became a rout. The Chinese defenders of Chengchow were successful for ten months against the Japanese ground operations, but when massed aerial bombing was at last resorted to, the city fell on October 25, 1938. This misuse of aviation together with Japan's failure to launch a systematic and concentrated strategic bombardment campaign against the Chinese turned the conflict into a war of attrition during 1939.

MODERN AIR POWER TESTED IN SPANISH CIVIL WAR

Both politically and militarily, the Spanish Civil War which began in July, 1936, was the most significant of the minor struggles which foreshadowed World War II. Russia contributed substantial military assistance to the cause of Republican Spain, and Germany and Italy backed the Fascist followers of Generalissimo Franco. It was transport units of the Luftwaffe which carried 18,000 Fascist troops from Morocco to Spain and saved the insurrection from prompt suppression. Despite the interest of the "sponsor" powers in the conduct of the Spanish War, however, no air forces of the size and efficiency of those which operated in World War II were ever seen on either side. A year of fighting had already gone by when P. Mikhailow, a Rus-

sian observer, reported that "Great numbers of planes were particularly employed in the Saragossa Operation. There were instances when the insurgents had as many as 80 planes in the air at a time, with the Loyalists using similar numbers of planes." As the war progressed, aviation was used with increasing frequency and in growing quantities. Nevertheless, 90 aircraft were thought to constitute a major aerial effort even during the Madrid campaign of July, 1938.

There are two main reasons why aerial warfare over Spain assumed no greater proportions than it did. First, Franco did not have to fight for aerial superiority. It was handed to him in the form of German and Italian equipment. Although Russia tried to offset this advantage to some extent by supplying the Loyalists with the latest types of Russian fighter craft the Soviets were either unwilling or unable to make the production effort which would have brought about parity in the air over Spain. Since the civil war never became sufficiently critical to cause the sponsoring powers to enter the conflict in force, the size of the military operations, both in the air and on the ground, were limited on one hand by Russia's failure to increase its aid to the Loyalists, and on the other by the Axis powers' willingness to participate only to a degree which would assure a Franco victory, provide their own general staffs with operational data, and supply their armed forces with cadres of combat-trained personnel.

The second limiting factor in the use of air power in the Spanish Civil War stems from the nature of the struggle. Both the Fascists and the Republicans were fighting for control of the country, and, as a result, the destruction of cities and production facilities by either belligerent would have produced for the attacker an immediate advantage and a subsequent liability in the event

of victory directly proportional to the success of the attack. The Fascists, therefore, tended to limit their air activity to cooperative operations with their ground forces, while the Loyalists, equipped largely with fighter craft, fought, in the main, defensive air battles against their numerically superior enemy. As might be expected under such circumstances, the Loyalists were credited with shooting down more aircraft than were Franco's airmen. But the mission of air power is to attack, and by their stubborn defense the pilots of the Republic only postponed their eventual defeat.

Although many military observers witnessed the war in Spain, their conclusions with regard to the war in the air varied widely. In 1936 there was very little military air experience along lines other than those of aerial reconnaissance and cooperative operations with ground forces. The fighting during the two years which followed did not greatly change this situation. Many of the military observers reporting on the aerial phases of the civil war gave frequent indications in their writings that they had no idea that air power might be used as anything but an adjunct to surface power. Furthermore, the special conditions, referred to above, imposed by the nature of civil war, together with the limited capabilities of the air equipment used and the inequality of the opponents, helped to cloud the picture which military leaders had hoped would show the true role of air power in modern war. One military observer, writing in the French publication "*Revue de l'Armée de l'Air*" in February, 1937 stated, after observing the unfolding of the air action in Spain, "If aviation is to be . . . an important part of military action, its essential weapon should be as simple as that of the troops; i.e., as the gun of the foot soldier." As an example of a disparate point of view, a plea for the construction of



The B-36, new six-engined, super-bomber, capable of flying a 10,000 pound bomb load 10,000 miles.

complex military bombardment aircraft made by General H. H. Arnold in the same year might be cited. "The war over Spain," said General Arnold, "affords an excellent example of what happens when commercial types are converted to military use. A considerable number of German-built commercial transports appeared over the battlefields during the past year in Spain; in the roof of the cabin, a round hole had been cut and a gun tourelle had been installed. That apparently, in the minds of the transformers, had made it a military plane. There were no guns in front. The pilots had poor visibility. The bombs were apparently to be just kicked out of the door. . . . The Russian planes with great ease began to knock down these converted commercial bombers."

Certainly there were valid lessons concerning the employment of air power derived from the Spanish war. Despite the fact that

some observers saw an indication that retractable landing gear was undesirable on fighter aircraft and that air power could be wielded most effectively by large numbers of small light biplanes capable of a top speed of 250 miles an hour, some clear, intelligent reports may be winnowed from the chaff which predominated.

C. Rougeron, a French aviation expert of unusual ability and perceptiveness, after observing Franco's use of aviation to deny freedom of water transport to the Loyalists, made this searching statement: "In two years the airplane has won a place beyond all question, at the head of the means employed for the control of maritime communications. It is readily understood that during the World War its still inadequate performance prevented it from playing such a part. But in view of the machines offered by the techniques of the past ten years, the stubbornness

displayed in wishing to reduce to a purely naval problem a question which manifestly pertained to the aerial domain is one of the finest examples of the errors which may be committed when one refuses to change his course until experience has rendered its judgment.

"The airplane is the most efficient device for the interdiction of maritime commerce, on the high seas or in port, whether it is employed or not for the benefit of the party who holds what may still remain of the mastery of the seas."

GERMANY HID AIR SECRETS OF SPANISH WAR

The German dive bombing of sensitive points on Loyalist rail lines provided the material for another valid lesson on the employment of air power taught by the Spanish War. Only the most alert of the military observers appreciated the full significance of the success of these operations because after the Germans proved the effectiveness of the technique to their own satisfaction, the attacks were discontinued and kept from the eyes of the world until Hitler plunged the world into war in 1939.

That bombers could not operate in the daytime without fighter escort became apparent to some onlookers during the course of the conflict, while it became evident that fighters could increase their effectiveness by flying in mutually supporting elements of three or four. Attack aviation, it was soon learned, was most effective when operating against troops and materiel changing position, and aircraft, shooting armor piercing projectiles, it was discovered, were effective against tanks. The long-held belief that troops in position were highly vulnerable to aerial attack was shown to be false, while the artillery stood out as one of the tactical objectives most easily hit from the air.

Advocates of strategic bombardment, both in this country and in Britain, found little to support their views as a result of the aerial warfare in Spain. High altitude horizontal bombing was so erratic that many observers concluded that only dive bombing could produce precision results. The unwillingness of either side to destroy cities and production facilities, which has been noted earlier, militated against experimentation in high altitude operations, and even the Fascist bombing of Valencia, Barcelona, and Madrid employed but a small number of aircraft and in a haphazard manner.

There have always been military men who attempt to predict the nature of future conflicts by carefully picking over the lessons of the most recently concluded war. This attempt to mirror the future in the past produced the disastrous tactics of the British Army in the French and Indian War, the French catastrophe in 1870, and the Maginot Line of 1940. Fortunately, it also produced the Luftwaffe.

The opinion that air power was properly an adjunct to surface power and that air power was incapable by itself of being decisive in war was held by most military minds before the events of World War II proved them wrong. The Luftwaffe was geared to the fly-wheel of the Wehrmacht, and as a result Germany began World War II with an air force which appeared to be the greatest vehicle of air power in the world but which actually proved to be capable of providing no more than the third dimension of a blitz campaign. If Germany had understood the concept of strategic bombardment and had produced an air force capable of sustained independent action World War II might well have ended differently.

Until Dunkirk, the Luftwaffe had things its own way. The Polish air force was annihilated within three weeks of the commence-



Major General I. W. Edwards, Commanding General of the United States air force in Europe, headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany.

ment of the campaign. In Norway, transport units of the Luftwaffe carried the advance guard of the invading force while Stukas assured the success of their landings and scouted the routes the German armor took in the rapid conquest of the country.

In the Flanders campaign which followed, the Dutch air force was disposed of in three days, and as in Norway, Luftwaffe transports carried the troops which invaded the Netherlands. In Belgium, Fort Eben Emael was taken by engineer troops who were crash-landed within that stronghold, making the Albert Line untenable. The famous Sedan breakthrough was prepared by the Luftwaffe, and it was the Luftwaffe which protected the flanks of Guderian and Rommel, permitting them to exploit their initial success without danger. But at Dunkirk, where the British stood with their backs to the sea, the German Air Force ran into serious opposition for

the first time. During the nine days of the great evacuation the Germans lost a quantity of aircraft which some sources place as high as 400 while the Royal Air Force itself lost but 100 and succeeded in covering the embarkation of the trapped British and French troops. This demonstration of the defensive ability of the Royal Air Force Spitfires and Hurricanes should have given Goering ample warning that he could not win the Battle of Britain with aircraft he possessed or with the plan he had devised. But warning or no, the Luftwaffe fumbled its great opportunity to bring the war in Europe to an early end and absorbed the first decisive defeat it had ever known.

There are six reasons why the Luftwaffe failed in its attempt to smash Britain from the sky. First, the lightly armed and armored Heinkels, Dorniers, and Messerschmitts were unable to provide any semblance of self defense against the eight gun fighters of the R.A.F. Designed as tactical aircraft, they were incapable of carrying the heavy bomb load called for by strategic operations, and they were not equipped for precision bombing. Second, the German fighters failed to evolve adequate escort tactics. Ignoring one of the valid lessons of the Spanish War, the Luftwaffe fighters flew in mass close support rather than in general support in units of three or four aircraft. Third, the Germans failed to evaluate the defensive strength of the R. A. F. and thought that aerial supremacy over Britain could be gained through aerial combat, the bombing of aerodromes, and a few scattered attacks on British aircraft factories. What worked in Poland and Holland ought to work against England, reasoned the Germans. Events proved how wrong they were. Fourth, Goering, having devised what might be called a tactical plan to achieve a strategic end, failed to carry out properly his inadequate scheme. The ob-

jectives of the three phases of the Battle of Britain (knocking out the perimeter aerodromes along the eastern and southeastern coast of England, knocking out the interior aerodromes centering around London, and the destruction of London) were not achieved at the time called for by Goering's timetable, yet, leaving unfinished business, he attempted to proceed according to plan. Fifth, the German Air Force, by attacking convoys and port installations, diverted a substantial portion of its strength from its main task: the defeat of the Royal Air Force. Sixth, the Luftwaffe was not organized to carry on a sustained air offensive. After the brief Polish campaign it had been given time to regroup and to replace equipment and personnel. The same was true after the Flanders campaign. But the Battle of Britain lasted for over three months, and when the German Air Force withdrew, it was exhausted.

AIR POWER DISREGARDS PERIMETER DEFENSE

The strategic air concept, kept alive by British and American air leaders despite widespread opposition during the years which preceded World War II, is both simple and profound. Before the advent of modern air power the destruction of the enemy's armed forces was the foremost objective of military and naval action. Beyond this primary objective, attrition was the main concern of naval forces while the capture of enemy territory and materiel concerned the land forces. Air power, when it came, provided a weapon able to disregard a nation's perimeter defenses and to strike at the very heart of its military strength—its war industry and its war economy. When the enemy's heart action stops, his military power dies.

Strategic bombardment is the most powerful weapon of war thus far produced be-

cause it embodies three of the principles of war to a uniquely high degree. The first of these principles, *the principle of mass*, is fulfilled by air power's ability to focus its total strength, which may be based over a wide area, upon a single target. The 1500 plane attacks on Berlin, flown by the Eighth Air Force in 1944, illustrate this quality. The second principle, *the principle of objective*, is actualized by air power through its capacity to select for destruction those targets most vital to the enemy's war economy. The ability of Allied strategic bombardment in Europe to select and destroy a substantial portion of Germany's aircraft production facilities, synthetic oil plants, and armament factories clearly demonstrates the embodiment of this principle. The third principle, *the principle of economy of force*, is incorporated in air action through air power's ability to bypass targets of secondary importance and strike at those objectives which give the greatest military reward in return for the force expended. The Eighth Air Force's having the option to neglect the rail yards at Erfurt, for example, and to fly on and hit the oil plants in the Leipzig area exemplify this third principle which is, in effect, a corollary of the second.

In America, the strategic concept dominated Air Force thinking throughout the two decades between the two world wars. In 1921 General Billy Mitchell struck the keynote with his prophecy: "... the only way that a war can be brought to a successful conclusion in case of determined resistance is to carry the war into the enemy's country; and in modern times this may mean attacking his whole population, means of production and subsistence." In the 1930's the weapon with which to execute the strategic concept came into being with the first model of the B-17. This aircraft, which was to undergo

extensive modification in the years immediately preceding World War II and during the war itself, was designed for daylight precision bombardment from high altitude.

When war came, the American doctrine of daylight bombing was locked upon with some misgivings by our British allies who had abandoned daylight bombing early in the conflict and turned to night operations. But the Royal Air Force was in basic accord with the U. S. Army Air Forces on the matter of strategic bombardment despite divergence of method. This very difference in bombardment technique worked to our mutual benefit when the Casablanca Directive of 1943 established the full scale strategic bombing program. Round-the-clock operations were possible with a British air force trained in night tactics, and an American air force able to attack by day.

REQUEST FOR MASSIVE AIR OFFENSIVE

On June 10, 1943, as a result of the Casablanca Directive, "The Combined Bomber

Offensive Plan" was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the tremendous effort which had forged the American air weapon began to pay military dividends. Although on August 17, 1942, twelve B-17s had struck the Eighth Air Force's first blow with an attack on an enemy objective in occupied France, the need to use what aircraft were available against German submarine pens and in the crucial "Torch" operation in North Africa had left German industry practically immune from bombardment. The Casablanca Directive, implemented by "The Combined Bomber Offensive Plan," enlarged the scale of the air offensive and called for the "destruction and dislocation of the German military industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to the point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."

The first task was the destruction of the German fighter defense. This vicious battle began in July, 1943, and culminated with "The Big Week" of February 20, 1944, when six days of perfect weather permitted a continuous assault on the widely dispersed German airframe factories and assembly plants. Although the German aircraft industry recovered from the effects of this massive blow, the Allies controlled the air over Europe during the remaining fourteen months of the war and German industry and transportation were exposed to a series of air attacks which carried the Reich to the point of economic collapse.

During the first four months of 1944 the attacks on the German aircraft industry were continued, and in May and June the forces which could be spared from the attacks on communications and transportation in preparation for the invasion of continental Europe began the offensive against German nitrogen and oil plants. Once the troops were securely




First American flag in Tokyo hoisted over Nippon News Building.

established in France the campaign against the German chemical industry began in strength, and, within six months, the output of aviation gasoline and nitrogen was cut 90 percent. By January, 1945, five months after the initiation of the offensive against Germany's transportation system, carloading had been reduced in volume by 75 percent, while the Ruhr's output of steel decreased fully 80 percent as a result of a 90-day campaign begun in October.

STRATEGIC BOMBING FORECAST END OF GERMANY

From December, 1944, on, the German war economy declined in all its departments. Albert Speer, Reichsminister of Armaments Production, interpreted the handwriting on the wall when he reported, on March 15, 1945, that "The German economy is heading for inevitable collapse within 4-8 weeks." Unfinished components in the production pipe-lines had permitted the emergence of finished munitions up to that time, but when inventories were exhausted further production was almost impossible. Although formal hostilities did not end until May 8, the strategic bombing effort was concluded on April 16. The validity of the concept which held air power's independent mission to be capable of contributing decisively to victory had been demonstrated.

Although air power is, of course, a continuing and dynamic force in world affairs, the evolution of air power reached its culmination in World War II when Japan surrendered unconditionally with her armies undefeated in major engagements and in control of nearly three million square miles of land populated by 500,000,000 people. The six months which preceded V-J Day were characterized by low level incendiary attacks by B-29s on the Japanese homeland. Our supremacy in the air, which had been achieved



Major General Muir S. Fairchild, Commanding General of the Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama.

by the end of 1943, and maintained continuously from that time onward, was exploited so thoroughly that Japan's war economy was paralyzed. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey calculated that both area and precision bombing were responsible for reducing the pre-attack capacity of Japanese oil refineries by 83 percent. Similarly, aircraft engine plants suffered a 75 percent production loss; airframe plants, 60 percent; electronics and communications plants, 70 percent; army ordnance plants, 30 percent; naval ordnance plants, 28 percent; merchant and naval shipyards, 15 percent; light metals, 35 percent; ingot steel, 15 percent; and chemicals, 10 percent.

The Japanese populace suffered a severe lowering of morale as a result of the realization that the Japanese armed forces had lost their ability to defend them from the impact of the aerial attacks which were demonstrating, before their very eyes, the hopelessness of further confidence in victory. So strongly did the B-29 attacks effect the Japanese people that just prior to V-J Day 64 percent of the populace felt personally unable to go on with the war.

In our victory over Japan, air power was



Major Richard I. Bong. Congressional Medal of Honor winner and leading ace of World War II.

unquestionably decisive. That the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands was unnecessary is clear evidence that air power has evolved into a force in war co-equal with land and sea power, decisive in its own right and worthy of the faith of its prophets.

The emphasis which today is being placed on research and development by the Army Air Forces points to the fact that air power continues to change and progress. Certainly the operational application of air power will change. It may be, for example, that massed bomber formations will soon be as obsolete as the Macedonian phalanx. But as long as air power remains the vehicle for some sort of destructive missile, the strategic concept as it is now understood will remain valid.

The strategic concept is so obviously a vital consideration in the formulation of national defense measures, that air power and its primary vehicle, the Army Air Forces, must be given whatever support is necessary

to maintain strategic offensive readiness with which to answer the actions of any future aggressor. It is a conviction widely held among military thinkers that if there is to be another war, it will begin with a strategic aerial attack launched in as great strength as the aggressor dares commit to achieve his objective. The United States has twice thrown its might into a world struggle to help decide the issue in favor of the forces of freedom. Since America is today the leading power in the world, any first class nation which shatters the peace will do so by first attacking us in an effort to eliminate at the outset the participation of our armed forces. The grave responsibility that is placed upon the Army Air Forces is readily apparent.

AN AIR FORCE SECOND TO NONE

If the Army Air Forces is to be able to meet this responsibility it must possess an air force in being capable of immediate action



Nazi guided missile program produced FX1400, radio-controlled, air-to-ground bomb used extensively against snipping.

with weapons second to none. An air force thus constituted must have adequate personnel thoroughly trained in the use of air weapons procurable as the result of a vigorous program of research and development, and the existence of a strong, readily expansible aircraft industry. Present planning indicates that a minimum of 400,000 officers and men is needed for our proposed air force in being. The Air Training Command together with the Air University, the Air Institute of Technology, the School of Aviation Medicine, civilian academic institutions, and training units within the operational organizations themselves can provide the necessary training and maintain the acquired proficiency. The Office of Research and Development is monitoring a program which is being carried out by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the Navy, the Ground Forces, the aircraft industry, the laboratories of academic and technical institutions, the research

and development facilities of the Army Air Forces itself, and, in the case of certain aspects of guided missiles research, the Signal Corps and the Ordnance Department. In addition to its activity in aerodynamics and allied subjects, the Army Air Forces is keenly interested in furthering a program for industrial mobilization which is currently under discussion.

It is obvious that a program to provide for national air defense such as that envisioned by the Army Air Forces is expensive, but the events which highlight the evolution of air power have convinced a great many thinking Americans that air power provides the greatest amount of defense procurable for their tax dollar. The realization of this truth must be spread so that the Army Air Forces will receive the support it needs, for in the evolution of air power, as in the evolution of man, an unstable world permits only the *survival of the fittest*.

THE MILITARY INFORMATION DIVISION: ORIGIN OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

By ELIZABETH BETHEL*

The value and importance, to say nothing of the convenience to the service, of having military data respecting our own and foreign armies in available shape for the immediate use of the War Department and the Army at large were subjects not seriously considered by the War Department until an incident occurred in 1885 which brought the matter forcibly to its attention. In that year the Secretary of War requested the Adjutant General, Brigadier General R. C. Drum, to furnish him immediately with information regarding a certain foreign army.¹ Much to his embarrassment, The Adjutant General had to reply that he did not have the information and that it would require some time to compile it. But if not supplied immediately, the information was of no use to the Secretary.²

The occurrence of such an incident in 1885 is not surprising. At that time there was no General Staff, and none of the so-called staff departments were responsible for gathering and collating data on all subjects of military interest. To prevent the recurrence of such an incident, General Drum decided to

establish a unit in his office for the collection of military data regarding our own and foreign armies which should be available for the use of the War Department and the Army.³ Accordingly, he directed Major William J. Volkmar, who was in charge of the Military Reservation Division of the Miscellaneous Branch, The Adjutant General's Office, to submit a project for organizing a Division of Military Information.⁴ The selection of Major Volkmar was probably because of the fact that he had more than the usual appreciation of the value of a knowledge of foreign armies. In 1885, while on leave of absence in Europe, he had been designated by the Secretary of War to attend the special maneuvers of the French Cavalry⁵ and had submitted noteworthy official reports. In these he stressed the advantage of an exchange of views with distinguished officers of other countries and made various comparisons between our service and that of foreign countries.⁶

With the assistance of several clerks of

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¹Copy of "Brief Outline of the Origin, Growth and Work of the Military Information Division, Adjutant General's Office," by Maj. W. A. Summers, Feb. 21, 1912, Army War College abstracted hereafter as A.W.C., file no. 589-15, National Archives. All unpublished materials cited hereafter are found in The National Archives unless otherwise indicated. The request of the Secretary of War and the reply of The Adjutant General must have been orders, as no further record of them has been found.

²Ibid.

³Copy of "Memorandum Outlining the Functions of the Adjutant General's Department and Showing the Origin and Development of an Intelligence Division as Part of the Office of The Adjutant General," by Adjutant General J. C. Kaiton, 1892, A.W.C., file no. 589-1.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Volkmar was graduated from the Military Academy in 1868. For an outline of his military career see George W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy* (hereafter cited as Cullum), No. 2248.

⁶His reports, entitled "French Cavalry Maneuvers" and "The Maneuvers of the 7th and 8th Corps of the French Army—Autumn 1885," are published in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, V, 1886.

the Military Reservation Division, Major Volkmar went to work gathering items of military interest from all available sources.⁷ For a preliminary organization he recommended that, besides the officer in charge, the Military Information Division should be composed of a Captain from the Ordnance Department, a Captain or First Lieutenant from the Engineers, Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry, each, and a Second Lieutenant from the Signal Corps;⁸ but this recommendation was not adopted, and it was many years before the division had more than one or two officers detailed to it in Washington. The assistance of the commanders of military departments and the chiefs of War Department bureaus "in the matter of increasing the efficiency of the 'Division of Military Information'" was requested in letters from The Adjutant General to these officers, dated November 23, 1886.⁹ The department commanders were asked to send in copies of reports of officers on hunting and fishing trips and on scouts near the frontier, as well as information concerning the resources of this country and neighboring foreign countries and concerning means of transportation. Officers of the Quartermaster's Department were to report concerning the resources of the part of the country in which they were serving, with particular reference to the supply of leather and cloth, and on the means of transportation; officers of the Subsistence Department were to report concerning the food supply, both as regards centers of production and output; officers of the Ordnance Department were to report regarding the sources of supply and output of arms and

ammunition; and all officers were requested to report on anything which it might be desirable for the Government to know in case of sudden war. A confidential call was also made upon the Adjutants General of the States and Territories for information concerning the strength, equipment and availability of the National Guard in case of a sudden demand.¹⁰ In order to make the information received accessible, an examination was made of the card system used by the Office of Naval Intelligence, which had been established in 1882, and that system, with certain modifications, was adopted by the Division of Military Information.¹¹

A beginning was thus made in a small way, toward the establishment of a military intelligence agency. Although usually referred to as the "Military Information Division," for the first few years of its existence this agency was merely an adjunct to the Military Reservation Division, Miscellaneous Branch, The Adjutant General's Office.

SYSTEM OF MILITARY ATTACHÉS

The year 1889 was marked by two important developments as far as the Military Information Division was concerned; these were the inauguration of the system of military attachés and the separation of the division from the Military Reservation Division. By the Act of September 22, 1888, Congress had provided for "the pay of a clerk attendant on the collection and classification of military information from abroad" and that "the officers detailed to obtain the same shall be entitled to mileage and transportation, and also computation of quarters while on this duty,

⁷Simpson, *loc. cit.*

⁸Volkmar to Adjutant General Drum, Jan. 21, 1886, Adjutant General's Office (abbreviated hereafter as A.G.O.), copy book of letters sent, vol. 77, p. 33 ff.

⁹A.G.O., copy book of letters sent, vol. 79, p. 225 ff.

¹⁰Kelton, *loc. cit.*

¹¹Copy of "Memorandum for The Adjutant General, U. S. Army" (no author given), Sept. 11, 1891, A.W.C., file no. 639.

as provided when on other duty."¹² Under the authority of this act the first military attaché was detailed to our legations at London and Berlin on March 11, 1889, and was instructed to report to the Secretary of War at least once every month, and as much often as circumstances might require, upon all matters of a military or technical character that might be of interest and value to any branch of the War Department and to the service at large.¹³ Later in the year military attachés were detailed to Paris, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.¹⁴ Under instructions from the Secretary of War the reports, maps, and plans received from these officers were sent to the Military Information Division where they were noted and filed.¹⁵ The Secretary also directed that several copies of all publications on military subjects be sent to the military attachés for exchange purposes.¹⁶ This resulted in the securing by the division of foreign publications and maps that were not for sale in the open market.¹⁷

On April 12, 1889, by confidential orders of the War Department, the Military Information Division was established as a separate and distinct division and placed under the personal supervision of The Adjutant General of the Army.¹⁸ Captain Daniel M. Taylor of the Ordnance Department was designated as officer in charge.¹⁹ Since 1886 he had been on special duty in connection with the division and he remained in charge until 1892.²⁰ All the information previously

collected and filed in the Military Reservation Division was transferred to the new division.²¹

As constituted by these orders and instructions, the division proceeded with its work,²² receiving reports, publications, and maps, indexing and filing them, and answering calls for information. It was hampered by inadequate personnel and office space, occupying a single room in the State, War, and Navy Building, with three clerks and a messenger constituting its clerical force.²³ Outside of the War Department it was little known, due in part to a feeling that it was not wise to advertise its work.²⁴ Nevertheless, some progress was made and by 1892 four thousand items of military interest had been carded.²⁵

Evidently most of the information received came from military attachés, for the Secretary of War stated in his annual report for 1892 that the information gathered by the division was of professional and scientific value but that it pertained exclusively to foreign armies.²⁶ A reorganization of the division was therefore announced in War Department General Orders No. 23, March 15, 1892, with a view to making its work on the home front more effective.²⁷ The duties assigned to the division by this order were essentially those discharged by foreign general staffs²⁸ and were as follows:

(a) The collection and classification of military information of our own and foreign

¹²U. S. Statutes at Large, XXV, 483.

¹³Simpson, *loc. cit.*

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵Copy of a circular issued by the Secretary of War, Apr. 19, 1889, in *ibid.*

¹⁶Copy of a circular issued by the Secretary of War, Nov. 11, 1889, in *ibid.*

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰Cullum, No. 2277.

²¹Simpson, *loc. cit.*

²²*Ibid.*

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴Taylor to the Secretary of War, March 23, 1892, A.G.O., document file no. 1547-ACP-1874.

²⁵War Dept., *Annual Report*, 1893, vol. I, p. 167.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 1892, vol. I, p. 7.

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸Copy of "Notes on the Military Information Division," by Lt. Carl Reichmann, Sept. 14, 1897, A.W.C., file no. 639-5.

countries, especially with regard to armed, reserved and available strength, natural and artificial means of communication (rivers, canals, highways, and railroads), the manufacture of arms, ammunition, and other war material, supplies of food, horses, draft animals, etc.

(b) The preparation of instructions for the guidance of officers of the Army serving or traveling abroad, or acting as military attachés, and the arrangement and digest of information contained in their reports.

(c) The issuance to the Army of military maps, monographs, books, papers, and other publications, and the dissemination of information on military subjects throughout all branches of the service.

(d) Correspondence with State authorities and militia officers on questions affecting the organization and armament of the militia of the States and Territories, and the reference to proper authorities of questions for decision relating to tactical instruction, discipline, and equipment.

(e) The preparation of instructions to the officers detailed by the Secretary of War to visit encampments of State troops and to witness the movements and exercises of the militia, as well as the digesting, arrangement, and preservation of the reports submitted by these officers.

(f) The study and preparation of plans for the mobilization and transportation of militia and volunteers and their disbandment, and for the concentration of the military forces of the United States at the various strategic points on or near the frontiers of the country.

The issuance of this order marks a turning point in the history of the Military Information Division. For the first time its functions were stated in more than general and perfunctory terms and they included, in ad-

dition to the collection, classification, and dissemination of military information, certain planning functions which properly pertain to a general staff. In fact, the duties now imposed on the division were similar to those which Major George M. Wheeler stated in his study "Confidential Notes on Military Intelligence Departments and General Staffs" were considered to be those of the "Great General Staff" of European armies.²⁹

REORGANIZATION

Under the impetus of this order, the Division of Military Information made considerable progress during the following decade. The work was systematized by organization into the following sections: militia, military progress, frontier, map, and Latin American.³⁰ In the latter part of 1897 a photographic section was added,³¹ and the organization of the division into these six sections remained practically unchanged until its transfer to the General Staff in 1903.³² The personnel was increased both in quantity and quality. An effort was made to place the sections in charge of officers who were carefully selected from the different arms of the service because of their aptitude for the work required of them.³³ The chiefs of the division included officers of prominence or who were to attain prominence in their profession. The order reorganizing the division designated Colonel Robert Williams³⁴ as offi-

²⁹Simpson, *loc. cit.*

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹Copy of "Memorandum" (no author given), June 11, 1903, A.W.C., file no. 639-16.

³²Simpson, *loc. cit.*

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴Cullum, No. 1512. Prior to being actively engaged in combat during the Civil War, Williams had served in the West and as instructor at the Military Academy. After the Civil War, he had several tours of duty in The Adjutant General's Office in Washington, D. C., interspersed with assignments as Adjutant General of various military departments and divisions.

cer in charge, with Major Arthur MacArthur as assistant.³⁵ Colonel Williams served for only a few months, however, as he was appointed Adjutant General of the Army in July of 1892. During the next two years Major John B. Babcock,³⁶ who subsequently served as a Brigadier General of Volunteers, had charge of the division. For slightly more than a year, dating from the fall of 1895, Colonel Thomas M. Vincent served as chief.³⁷ Vincent had had long and prominent service in The Adjutant General's Office and was the author of "Staff Organizations—a Plea for the Staff" and of several official reports on army and staff organizations. At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, Major Arthur L. Wagner,³⁸ chief of the division for the past year, relinquished that post on orders to go to Cuba and establish a military information division with the army in the field.³⁹ Wagner had previously been instructor in military art at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, and while serving as head of the Military Information Division had also been a

member of the joint Army and Navy Board to harmonize military and naval operations. He was a prolific writer on military subjects, among his works being *The Service of Security and Information*. The chief of longest tenure was Colonel William A. Simpson,⁴⁰ who served from October, 1898, to June, 1903, and was one of the officers initially selected as a member of the General Staff.

PERSONNEL CHANGES

As regards numbers, the personnel increased from a staff of one officer, three clerks, and a messenger in 1889 to twelve officers, ten clerks and two messengers at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War.⁴¹ In addition, forty officers on duty with the national guard and militia of the States and Territories⁴² and sixteen military attachés assigned to our legations abroad⁴³ received instructions from and reported to the division. From time to time, also, it received reports from officers specially detailed to attend encampment and other military activities of State and Territorial troops and from officers sent abroad for special purposes. It was on the initiative of the Division of Military Information that Major Theodore Schwan spent seven months in Germany in 1892-1893 collecting military information⁴⁴

³⁵MacArthur served as a volunteer officer in the Civil War and entered the Regular Army in 1856. See Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, 1789-1903* (cited hereafter as *Heitman*). He rose to the grade of lieutenant general.

³⁶Babcock also served as a volunteer officer in the Civil War, entering the Regular Army in 1857. See *Heitman*.

³⁷*Cullum*, No. 1589. During the two years just prior to the Civil War, Vincent was an assistant professor at the Military Academy; most of his service during the Civil War was as a staff officer in Washington; and thereafter the greater part of his service until his retirement in 1895 was as an Assistant Adjutant General in Washington.

³⁸*Cullum*, No. 2589. Prior to his assignment to the Military Information Division, Wagner's service was mostly in the West. He saw active service in the Spanish-American War, and subsequently served as an Adjutant General in the Philippines and in various military departments in the United States. In 1904 he was appointed to the General Staff Corps and was serving as Assistant Director of the Army War College at the time of his death on June 17, 1905.

³⁹Simpson, *loc. cit.*

⁴⁰*Cullum*, No. 2555. Simpson had been an assistant professor at the Military Academy, and after his tour of duty with the Military Information Division he served as Chief of Staff and Adjutant General of a number of military departments. He reached the retirement age in 1918 but was continued on active service during the war.

⁴¹Simpson, *loc. cit.*

⁴²*Ibid.*

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴A.G.O., "Yearly Station Book of General and Staff Officers," 1892. Schwan was born in Germany and entered the Army as a private in 1857. He received an officer's commission during the Civil War and was appointed a brigadier general just prior to his retirement in 1901. In 1898 he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for gallantry in action during the Civil War. See *Heitman*.

and that at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War Lt. Andrew S. Rowan was sent to Cuba, in advance of our forces, to establish communication with General Garcia, the commander of the insurgent forces then operating against the Spaniards.⁴⁵ The former mission resulted in the publication of a report entitled *Organization of the German Army*⁴⁶ and the latter in the delivery of the famous "Message to Garcia."⁴⁷ During the Spanish-American War the personnel of the division was drastically reduced, as all but two officers in the division proper and five military attachés were relieved for field service.⁴⁸ By 1902, however, its personnel had grown to five officers, four clerks, four translators, three draftsmen, two photographers, three messengers, and nine attachés.⁴⁹

With these improved facilities came an ever-increasing volume of work. Calls for military information were received from officers of all grades, members of Congress, other civil officers of the Government, and occasionally from private individuals.⁵⁰ By 1894, the number of index cards on file had jumped to thirty thousand,⁵¹ fifteen thousand more were added during the year 1896,⁵² and by 1903 the cards totalled over three hundred thousand.⁵³ Among the subjects covered by the cards were inventions in arms, equipment, and explosives; progress in all phases of military art; and the armed strength, geog-

raphy, and resources of foreign countries.⁵⁴ The information thus compiled was not simply filed away for possible future reference, but pertinent non-confidential information was forwarded, for notation and return, to the Chiefs of Bureaus, the Headquarters of the Army, and the several military schools.⁵⁵ In countries where we had no military attachés the division secured information through our consuls and diplomatic officers⁵⁶ and eventually it was officially designated as the channel through which foreign governments received military information about the United States.⁵⁷ Information was also exchanged with the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Navy and a system was developed whereby professional information received in one office of interest to the other was promptly forwarded for notation and carding.⁵⁸

NEW PROMOTION METHODS

The division's role in connection with the military schools was a particularly important one. In 1890 Congress passed an act providing for a system of examination to determine the fitness for promotion of all officers of the Army to grades below that of Lieutenant Colonel.⁵⁹ At this time academic training was limited to those officers who were selected to attend the special schools, and there was no provision for the continuing professional education of the Officers Corps as a whole. To remedy this situation, War Department General Orders No. 80, October 5, 1891, provided that there should be established at every post garrisoned by troops of the line an officers' lyceum. The post com-

⁴⁵Simpson, *loc. cit.*

⁴⁶War Dept., *Annual Report*, 1894, vol. I, p. 181.

⁴⁷A.W.C., file no. 117-26, National War College. This file is entitled "Message to Garcia" and consists of documents relating to the event that were collected sometime afterwards. Among the papers in the file is a memorandum of December 28, 1897, by Major Arthur L. Wagner recommending that an officer be sent to Cuba to examine into and report on the military situation.

⁴⁸Simpson, *loc. cit.*

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

⁵⁰War Dept., *Annual Report*, 1895, vol. I, p. 184.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 1894, vol. I, p. 181.

⁵²*Ibid.*, 1896, vol. I, p. 157.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 1903, vol. I, p. 157.

⁵⁴Simpson, *loc. cit.*

⁵⁵Copy of "Memorandum" (no author given), Sept. 5, 1891, A.W.C., file no. 639-2.

⁵⁶Copy of "A Brief Summary of the Establishment and Progress of the Military Information Division" (no author given), March 21, 1907, A.W.C., file no. 639-31.

⁵⁷War Dept. Circular No. 6, Sept. 4, 1903.

⁵⁸War Dept., *Annual Report*, 1902, vol. I, p. 322.

⁵⁹U. S. Statutes at Large, XXVI, 562.

mander, as president of the lyceum, was to prepare a course of instruction and assignments were to be made with special reference to requirements of examinations for promotion. In addition to systematic recitations in connection with the prescribed course of study, every officer belonging to the lyceum was annually assigned a selected professional subject on which he made original investigations and a written report. These papers were read and discussed at meetings of the lyceum and, if the officer concerned wished, they were submitted to his promotion board where they were considered in determining his fitness for promotion. The Military Information Division answered many a call in connection with the lyceum courses.⁶⁰ It not only furnished the actual information needed when it was on file, but also indicated sources and loaned pertinent publications. In 1895 department commanders were directed to forward the more valuable reports to The Adjutant General's Office, with a view to publication by the Military Information Division.⁶¹

The development of the division's map collection kept pace with that of its information file. Prior to the division's organization, the War Department was not in possession of any authentic maps of Canada or Mexico,⁶² but by 1891 the Military Information Division had prepared an excellent map of Canada and had one of Mexico nearing completion.⁶³ Anticipating active military operations, the division issued maps and notes of Cuba and Puerto and later of the Philippine Islands.⁶⁴ By 1902 it had in its files over six thousand maps of domestic

and foreign territory, including complete sets of the general staff maps of a number of European countries.⁶⁵

In 1893 a program of publication was inaugurated, with a view to publishing annual or semi-annual reports of military progress for the information of the line of the Army.⁶⁶ These publications played an important part in the dissemination through the Army as a whole of information relating to military affairs in general and particularly to foreign armies. The first was a pamphlet on the Hawaiian Islands with maps and charts, the second was Major Schwan's report on the organization of the German Army, already mentioned, and others included a series on the organized militia of the United States at its annual encampments, a series of annual "Notes of Military Interest," and "Colonial Army Systems of the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium."⁶⁷ In addition to their main, if unspectacular, function of increasing the flow of professional information, the publications furnished an outward and visible sign of the activities of the division and were thus of great value as a concession to Congressional impatience.⁶⁸ To illustrate, in 1898, but before the Spanish-American War broke out, notice was taken of the fact that the division had published

⁶⁰*Ibid.*

⁶¹War Dept., *Annual Report*, 1894, vol. I, p. 181.

⁶²By 1903 a series of thirty-eight numbered publications had been issued, as well as a number of maps. The titles of some of the publications are as follows: *The Autumn Manoeuvres of 1894. Austria-Hungary, France, and Germany: Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China (1901); Target Practice and Remount Systems Abroad; The Military Schools of Europe and Other Papers Selected for Publication; Sources of Information on Military Professional Subjects; Notes on the War Between China and Japan; and French-English Military Technical Dictionary*. For others see War Dept., *Annual Reports*.

⁶³Copy of "Memorandum for the Chief of the Second Division," by Capt. C. DeW. Willcox, Oct. 17, 1906. A.W.C., file no. 639-30.

⁶⁰War Dept., *Annual Report*, 1894, vol. I, p. 182.

⁶¹War Department General Orders No. 58, Nov. 13, 1895.

⁶²Copy of "Memorandum for The Adjutant General," Sept. 11, 1891, *loc. cit.*

⁶³*Ibid.*

⁶⁴Simpson, *loc. cit.*

nothing for some time, and it was directed to get out something. A protest was made on the ground that the officers of the division, realizing that war was imminent, were working night and day to collect data on Cuba, but to no avail. The answer was that something had to be done to justify to Congress the division's existence. So the officers all laid aside their really important staff work, dug into the files, and published a collection of papers on "Pioneer Tools in Foreign Armies," which seemed to answer the purpose!⁶⁹

INADEQUATE APPROPRIATIONS

The division was always hampered by inadequate appropriations. Until 1894 it was dependent for funds upon whatever was allotted to it from the appropriation for contingent expenses of the War Department,⁷⁰ but in that year Congress appropriated \$3,640 for the contingent expenses of the Military Information Division.⁷¹ This amount, which continued to be appropriated in the years following, soon proved insufficient, and it was with great difficulty that Congress was persuaded to raise the appropriation. By 1903, the appropriation had only been increased to \$10,000 and of this amount an allotment of \$3,000 was made to the Manila Office of the division.⁷²

Although still rudimentary in form and concept, the Military Information Division proved its worth on the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. When Spain began to send troops and material to Cuba our military attaché at Madrid sent in reports, newspaper clippings, etc., from which the strength of the Spanish Army in Cuba was

computed. Some time later the Spanish Government published an official statement of the men and material sent to Cuba, and although the number of men reached the figure of nearly 130,000, it was found that the computation made by the division was correct to within less than 2,000 men.⁷³ In consequence of the attaché's reports, the War Department was fully aware in 1897 of Spain's preparation for war and of her military condition,⁷⁴ information which was to prove priceless when war actually came. The collection of data regarding Cuba by the staff of the division in the United States as well as the sending of an officer to the island to communicate with General Garcia has already been mentioned. In addition, an officer was also dispatched to Puerto Rico to prepare the ground for the arrival of our forces on that island.⁷⁵

The War Department General Staff was established by Act of February 14, 1903,⁷⁶ to be effective on August 15, 1903, and on August 8, 1903, the Secretary of War issued an order providing for the transfer of the Military Information Division to the Office of the Chief of Staff.⁷⁷ This was a logical step, inasmuch as the General Staff was responsible for the efficiency of the Army and for making plans for its organization and mobilization in the light of all contingencies that might arise in the future, duties that could not possibly be carried out successfully without the information necessary to arrive at correct military decisions. Thus, the Military Information Division was the forerunner of the indispensable Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff.

⁶⁹Reichmann, *loc. cit.*

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

⁷¹Simpson, *loc. cit.*

⁷²*U. S. Statutes at Large*, XXXII, 830.

⁷³Copy of "Memorandum for the Secretary, General Staff," by Maj. D. M. Boughton, May 10, 1909 A.W.C., file no. 639 44.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*

⁷⁰Reichmann, *loc. cit.*

⁷¹*U. S. Statutes at Large*, XXVIII, 243.

⁷²War Dept., *Annual Report*, 1903, vol. I, p. 157.

THE DEBATE ABOUT HIROSHIMA

By RUDOLPH A. WINNACKER*

Ever since August 6, 1945, a violent argument has been carried on in newspapers and pamphlets as well as on the radio regarding the necessity of using the atomic bomb against Japan. For a long time the debate was rather one-sided as the critics of the government's actions held the center of the stage. The defenders of American policy failed to catch public attention until the winter of 1946-47, when Karl T. Compton, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and one of the government's chief scientific advisers on atomic policy, stated his view of the case in *The Atlantic Monthly*,¹ and Secretary Henry L. Stimson published in *Harper's* a thorough and authoritative account of the considerations which entered into the decision to use the bomb.² With these publications it has become possible to analyze the issues involved. While more details on American and Japanese policy in July and August 1945 will undoubtedly become available, still the basic facts are known at present, and no future

publications are likely to add any important new material to either side of the argument.

The point of view of those arguing against the use of the bomb is probably best summarized by Professor Albert Einstein's remarks: "Before the raid on Hiroshima, leading physicists urged the War Department not to use the bomb against defenseless women and children. The war could have been won without it. The decision was made in consideration of possible future loss of American lives—and now we have to consider possible loss in future atomic bombings of millions of lives. The American decision may have been a fatal error, for men accustomed themselves to thinking a weapon which was used once can be used again. Had we shown other nations the test explosion at Alamogordo, New Mexico, we could have used it as an education for new ideas. It would have been an impressive and favorable moment to make considered proposals for world order to end war. Our renunciation of this weapon as too terrible to use would have carried great weight in negotiations and made convincing our sincerity in asking other nations for a binding partnership to develop these newly unleashed forces for good."³ Many others expressed similar views throughout 1946, and Raymond Swing gave this school of thought wide circulation by his Friday evening broadcasts on the atomic problem. In general Swing's thesis was that the American use of

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¹Karl T. Compton, "If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Used," *The Atlantic Monthly*, December 1946, Vol. 178, No. 6, pp. 54-56; see also President Truman's letter to Dr. Compton. *Ibid.*, February 1945, Vol. 179, No. 2, p. 27.

²Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," *Harper's Magazine*, February 1944, Vol. 194, pp. 97-107; republished in *Reader's Digest*, March 1945, and *The Infantry Journal*, March 1947, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 35-41. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations in the following pages are from Secretary Stimson's article.

³Albert Einstein, "Only Then Shall We Find Courage," Pamphlet by the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, January 1947.



Atomic bomb damage at Hiroshima. Destructive power of a single bomber was vastly raised. Early stage of the Bikini bomb blast.

the bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki hit a new low in moral standards for the conduct of war, that the employment of this weapon was unnecessary as Japan was ready to surrender, and that we started an atomic armament rave by not being satisfied with a theoretical demonstration of the bomb before United Nations representatives.¹

The persuasive power of these arguments lies not only in their appeal to our basic ethical views but also in their hypothetical character. Hypotheses which promise an alternative to the sordid present always carry a tremendous appeal. A demonstration of the validity of the suggested alternative is however, impossible, as history moves steadily forward, and thus each individual is free to

advance his own pet hypothesis without fear of ever being indicted by facts. No one will ever know for certain at what time Japan would have surrendered without the use of the atomic bomb and without an invasion of the home islands. Consequently, any discussion of the employment of alternative atomic policies in the summer of 1945 quickly degenerates to the level of all discussions dealing with "ifs" in history. The only method for a historian or a layman to work his way through the contradictory hypotheses consists of evaluating for himself the reasons for the decisions made. In this respect we have been most fortunate, as Secretary Stimson has stated fully the reasons which moved him and his assistants to advise the President to use the atomic bomb against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

No one can read Secretary Stimson's ac-

¹Especially Mr. Swing's broadcasts of April 5, May 17, July 12, August 23, and December 13, 1946.

count without being impressed by the careful consideration which was given to the problem. Assured by scientists of the eventual feasibility of the project, the government entered the atomic armament race with the knowledge that victory in this war might well depend on success in the enterprise ahead of the enemy. With the spring of 1945 the outcome of the experiment was no longer in doubt, and the consequences of the employment of the atomic weapon were carefully weighed. Alternatives to the direct military use of the bomb, such as a preliminary warning or a theoretical demonstration, were considered, but discarded as impracticable. A preliminary warning would have been inadvisable, since "even the New Mexico test would not give final proof that any given bomb was certain to explode when dropped from an airplane. . . . Nothing would have been more damaging to our effort to obtain surrender than a warning or a demonstration followed by a dud—and this was a real possibility." A purely technical demonstration was also inadvisable since it was "felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisers, they must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the Empire."

THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN

The Secretary's article cuts also through the fog created by some scientists and commentators who, impressed by the total and orderly surrender of Japanese forces after victory had been achieved, advanced the opinion that final Japanese surrender at the beginning of August was only a question of a few weeks—atomic bomb or no atomic bomb. To support this opinion, the critics of the government's policy point to Japanese attempts to negotiate with the Allies via Russia. They quote the statement in the report of the United States Strategic Bombing

Survey that "even without the atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate the need for invasion."⁵ They also find support in Captain Zacharias, who states in his book *Secret Missions* that "Japan would have accepted our surrender terms even without the prodding which the two atomic bombs provided."⁶ It is equally true that Japan should have surrendered in February and March 1945 as one after another of her cities was burned to the ground and certainly in May as her only remaining ally crumbled to pieces; but she did not. Moreover, Germany, too, should have surrendered in the fall of 1944; but she did not. The strategic situation of both nations was hopeless at these respective dates; but in fact one nation—and this the one considered by most observers the more rational of the two—fought to the bitter end, and the other might very well have followed the same course unless given a way out by the use of an unprecedented weapon which justified the acceptance of the most drastic peace terms.

Secretary Stimson's account of how those responsible for the conduct of the war analyzed the strategic situation should do much to bring all such speculations back to earth. "The principal political, social, and military objective of the United States in the summer of 1945 was the prompt and complete surrender of Japan. Only the complete destruction of her military power could open the way to lasting peace. Japan, in July 1945, had been seriously weakened by our increasingly violent attacks. It was known to us that she had gone so far as to make tentative proposals to the Soviet government, hoping to use the Russians as mediators in a nego-

⁵United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report, Pacific War* (Washington, 1946), p. 26.

⁶Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, USN, *Secret Mission*, (New York, 1946), p. 388.



BIKINI BLAST

tiated peace. These vague proposals contemplated the retention by Japan of important conquered areas and were therefore not considered seriously." No difference of opinion could or did exist as to the outcome of the struggle, but the cost of final victory was likely to be tremendous unless an early surrender of the enemy's armed forces could be achieved. To gain this objective, the Potsdam ultimatum, promising destruction if Japan resisted and hope if she surrendered, was issued on July 26, only to be rejected two days later as unworthy of public notice. "In the face of this rejection we could only proceed to demonstrate that the ultimatum had

meant exactly what it said when it stated that if the Japanese continued the war, 'the full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.' For such a purpose the atomic bomb was an eminently suitable weapon." This judgment was borne out by events. With the atomic bomb as an excuse, "the peace party was able to take the path of surrender, and the whole weight of the Emperor's prestige was exerted in favor of peace. When the Emperor ordered surrender, and the small but dangerous group

of fanatics who opposed him were brought under control, the Japanese became so subdued that the great undertaking of occupation and disarmament was completed with unprecedented ease." And Secretary Stimson concludes: "I cannot see how any person vested with such responsibilities as mine could have taken any other course or given any other advice to his chiefs."

Thus Secretary Stimson's article dispels many of the misconceptions which muddled earlier discussions. It shows that the men in charge of government policy were fully aware of the responsibility they carried, that alternatives to the course finally adopted were carefully considered, and that, faced by enemy resistance of indeterminable length, the decision to use the bomb against Japan was finally made with the objective of saving millions of lives and in the conviction "that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities . . . could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face." Despite the Secretary's statement the debate over the use of the bomb will probably continue. Both sides will agree that Japan would eventually have surrendered without the use of the new weapon, but they will differ greatly on the all-important time factor. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, generally optimistic on this question, subsequently advanced the opinion that certain Japanese surrender would have occurred prior to December 31, 1945 and probable surrender prior to November 1, 1945, the tentative date set for the invasion of Kyushu.⁷ To what extent should our government have been guided by such an estimate, in view of the proven inaccuracy of similar optimistic opinions for Germany and the ever increasing Japanese resistance as our

armed forces approached the home islands? All those who were in the Pacific or had relatives in that theater will be unanimous in their answer.

THE MORAL ISSUE

The basic reason for the debate is undoubtedly the moral issue which has been raised. The opponents of the government's policy feel that "the use of the bomb put upon us the mark of Cain,"⁸ that the way we used it did away "with the moral distinction that must be made in every war—a distinction between civilians and military,"⁹ and that "with the advent of the atomic bomb, we went over to the initiative of setting a low standard" for the conduct of war.¹⁰ This debate about the ethics of war has raged ever since moral consciousness started to influence the behavior of man; in fact, its continuance is necessary if the world is ever to be successful in abolishing the scourge of war. Still, it should be clear to all that unilateral adherence to moral absolutes, such as pacifism, will lead inevitably to enslavement and destruction in our present world. Moreover, it is debatable that the abolishment of war is furthered by restricting its horror to the front line and the armed forces. Each one of us has and will make his own compromise with reality, but the important fact in all such compromises is that the moral ideal itself is not lost. Many of us feel moral indignation about the bombing of Warsaw, Rotterdam, and Coventry and yet, without being hypocritical, accept the necessity of destroying the cities of Germany and Japan. We can kill in war and still disapprove of killing. This is the necessary compromise we have to make for the survival of our civilization. We will have sunk to the Nazi level

⁸*Washington Post*, January 28, 1947.

⁹Msgr. Fulton J. Sheen as reported in *New York Times*, April 3, 1946.

¹⁰Raymond Swing's Broadcast, August 23, 1946.

⁷United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report, Pacific War*, p. 26.



Aerial view of Hiroshima taken after the August 6, 1945 atomic bombing emphasizes the complete desolation the missile created.

when this bombing and killing is accepted as the natural behavior of man, instead of as a grim necessity required for the preservation of our moral values.

The moral consideration which moved the men in charge of atomic policy have been well expressed by Secretary Stimson: "As I read over what I have written, I am aware that much of it, in this year of peace, may have a harsh and unfeeling sound. It would perhaps be possible to say the same things and say them more gently. But I do not think it would be wise. As I look over the five years of my service as Secretary of War, I see too many stern and heartrending decisions to pretend that war is anything else than what it is. The face of war is the face of death; death is an inevitable part of every order that a wartime leader gives. The decision to use the atomic bomb was a decision that brought death to over a hundred thousand Japanese. No explanation can change this fact and I do not wish to gloss it over. But this deliberate, premeditated destruction was our least abhorrent choice. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put an end to the Japanese war. It stopped the fire raids, and the strangling blockade; it ended the ghastly specter of a clash of great land armies. In this last great action of the Sec-

ond World War we were given final proof that war is death. War in the twentieth century has grown steadily more barbarous, more destructive, more debased in all its aspects. Now, with the release of atomic energy, man's ability to destroy himself is very nearly complete. The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended a war. They also made it wholly clear that we must never have another war. This is the lesson men and leaders everywhere must learn, and I believe that when they learn it they will find a way to lasting peace. There is no other choice."

There are moralists among us who will continue to believe that no reason could have justified the use of the atomic weapon and also cynics who will feel that all this talk about moral standard is pure rot. Fortunately, the vast majority of us are realistic idealists and will probably agree with the ex-Infantryman who wrote to the *Washington Post*: "History will not scorn us for our last-resort use of this most horrible of all weapons to end finally and completely the most horrible of all wars. But we will be damned as barbarians without vision or heart if we do not feel the deepest sadness at the necessity for authorizing such cruelty."¹¹

¹¹*Washington Post*, November 13, 1946.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE BROOKLYNS?

An Account of the Series of Unlucky Events which have Befallen Ships of this Name Since the Civil War

Baseball fans may think this is to "pan" those eccentric National League players whose home park is just across the East River in Flatbush. Before the enmity of those rabid Dodger rooters is incurred it is best to state that all references are to those vessels in the United States Navy that have borne the name *Brooklyn*. The current one fortunately seems to be breaking the jinx, as her record is clear and bids fair to remain so. Her predecessors, however, include in their logs a most remarkable series of unfortunate performances. In every case it was a serious sin of omission or commission on the part of the commander of the ship that left a bad mark on the vessel's name, and in most instances unfortunate results came to pass with still more disastrous results narrowly avoided.

The first *Brooklyn* was a large steam sloop-of-war completed just before the Civil War. She was a sister ship of the *Hartford* and others, displaced 2,700 tons and boasted ten 9-inch smoothbores in each broadside supported with four smaller rifled guns. She had two simple engines on a single shaft and on her trials she made 9.2 knots in smooth water with steam alone. This class of wooden ships, full-rigged for sail, were the finest of their type, though they became obsolete very soon after their completion when England and France began to commission their sea-going ironclads.

In June, 1861, blockade of the Mississippi River among other places, had been put into effect. The two main mouths were guarded by heavy ships. The *Powhatan* lay off the Southwest Pass and the *Brooklyn* guarded Pass à L'Outre. The Confederate raider *Sumter*, Commander Raphael Semmes commanding, dropped down the river from New Orleans to the Head of the Passes on June 21. There she lay, awaiting an opportunity to slip out to sea for she was no match in fighting strength for either Union ship. She spent nearly nine days at anchor with both her presence and object known to the blockaders. So near were they a good deal of the time the smoke and topmasts of each ship were visible to its enemy. Finally on June 30 word reached the *Sumter* that the *Brooklyn* had steamed away after a sail. Without delay Semmes made a dash for the sea down Pass à L'Outre aided by a four-knot current. Although many miles away by this time, the *Brooklyn* perceived the *Sumter's* smoke almost as soon as her anchor was aweigh. The *Brooklyn* was boarding her capture. Concerning the attempt to cut off the *Sumter*, the skipper of the *Brooklyn* reports: "As soon as the boarding boat returned, I stood in to intercept her." The *Sumter* got past the *Brooklyn* by the very narrowest of margins, thus a fitting start for the series of tragi-comedies associated with the *Brooklyns*.



The first Brooklyn fought through the Civil War. A wood sloop-of-war of 233' length and 2,586 tons displacement, she mounted twenty or twenty-two 9-inch smoothbores and from two to six rifles of various sizes. Two boilers and two horizontal simple engines developed 878 horsepower at 9.2 knots in smooth water.

The *Brooklyn* started in pursuit, both ships being under steam and sail. The *Sumter* worked to windward forcing the *Brooklyn* to furl her sails. The chase continued; the *Sumter* was within range but the *Brooklyn* never at any time fired a shot. After a considerable interval the *Brooklyn's* log reads: "Did not change the distance from her." Her commanding officer reports: "Finding I could not overhaul her, and being out of sight of my station and having seen a sail standing in that direction, I deemed it necessary to give up the chase and return." He did not appreciate how infinitely important it was to prevent the escape of this ship. The sighting of a sail helped persuade him to desist. He should have followed the *Sumter* at best speed all day until the quarry was irrevocably lost to sight. Undoubtedly the *Sumter's* precious limited supply of coal would have been seriously depleted, and if

she suffered the slightest engineering casualty she would have fallen easy prey to the *Brooklyn*. The latter's commanding officer desisted after a few hours' steaming, strangely enough, even while "Fearing that this vessel, which is more than a match for our gunboats in armament, might do great mischief," etc. "Do great mischief" is a mild description of the havoc she created before she wound up her career. Semmes' brilliant records in both the *Sumter* and the *Alabama* all stem from the *Brooklyn's* failures on that distant 30th of June. It was a sad day for the Union when she got to sea.

RUNNING THE BATTERIES AT VICKSBURG

The *Brooklyn* again entered the dog house almost exactly a year after the *Sumter's* escape. Farragut's fleet which ran past Vicksburg on June 28, 1862, was disposed in two columns for the occasion. On the starboard, or engaged side, the *Richmond*

led, followed by the flagship *Hartford* and the *Brooklyn*. The port column consisted of eight lighter vessels, the first two being on the *Richmond's* bow, the next two on the *Hartford's* bow, the next two on the *Brooklyn's* bow, and the last two on her quarter. The significance of this passage was limited. Neither side suffered any appreciable loss and the capture of Vicksburg was not hurried thereby. Farragut had not been in favor of the venture but was forced into it against his better judgment.

When Farragut's fleet passed the Vicksburg batteries, the *Brooklyn* never made it, she and the two gunboats following her. They steamed up the river, engaged the enemy, and dropped down again! This brought a stinging rebuke from Farragut to the Commanding Officer of the *Brooklyn* . . . a new commander since the preceding June. After the prolonged anxiety over the non-appearance of his three rearmost vessels, Farragut awaited their reports. He did not accept as valid the excuses of two of the captains for not continuing past Vicksburg along with the rest of the fleet. His letter to the *Brooklyn's* commanding officer included the following: "But, sir, when you presume to shelter yourself under the idea that I left you or any other officer the right to stop at pleasure and change my general order, you assume the right to annul my orders, or act according to your own will. . . . But, sir, it was your duty to have followed your flag-officer until his situation justified you in abandoning him as hopeless. . . . Now, sir; did you ever reach the head of the river? I can answer for you, that you were never within a mile and a half of it. . . . We were moving as slowly as possible, waiting for the *Brooklyn* to come up. . . . We continued passing up at the slowest possible speed, and once stopped for you, . . . but I trusted to our early education . . . that every

man would follow his file leader, so I went ahead, believing that all would do likewise, and no one regrets more deeply than I do that they did not."

That is what might be termed "hot stuff," and the recipient did not fail to note its temperature. He replied, in part: "Yesterday you were pleased to address such a letter to me as no officer possessing the least particle of self-respect could receive submissively without degrading himself to the level of a serf. . . . I respectfully request to be relieved from my command with permission or orders to proceed to the north. . . ." Whereupon Farragut wound up the matter with an order including the following summation: "As to my letter of yesterday, it speaks for itself. I found fault with two things in your course . . . first, your not coming up past the batteries with the rest of the fleet; second, your quoting my instructions to cover your case, which I knew you were not justified in doing. In conclusion, sir, your request to return home is granted, . . . you will transfer the command of the *Brooklyn* to Commander "H. H. Bell."

The story is covered pretty well in the official documents from which the above quotations are taken. These are presented because censure as strong as this is a rare thing in Navy correspondence. This much, however, must be said for the old *Brooklyn*; her commanding officer was something less than one hundred percent to blame, because Farragut's General Order for the attack frankly was not worded and phrased in as complete a manner as it might have been.

"DAMN THE TORPEDOES!"

More than two years passed before the *Brooklyn* found herself in another unfortunate circumstance. Again it was perhaps not entirely her fault. It occurred while Farragut's fleet was passing Fort Morgan

which guarded the entrance to Mobile Bay; this was the first and all-important phase of the naval operations which are ordinarily lumped together and loosely called the "Battle of Mobile Bay." The Confederates had planted an east-west mine-field across the entrance which blocked a great part of the channel. Any ship not wishing to risk the mines was compelled to pass close under the guns of Fort Morgan. However, the span and the eastern limits of the field were clearly marked by buoys, and there was ample room left in the channel for boats to clear. Farragut determined to make the run at that point and in double column. The column nearer the fort consisted of four monitors headed by the *Tecumseh*. The other part was comprised wholly of wooden ships, its head to be approximately abreast of the center of the column of monitors.

There were seven, heavy, wooden, single-screw sloops-of-war and a like number of gunboats, the leading three being side-wheel double-enders. They were lashed in pairs, each gunboat to a sloop, in order that each might provide motive power to her consort in case of emergency. The steam pressure was to be kept low when the operation was carried out, for the speed through the water under the circumstances would be slow. In order to decrease the risk to the Admiral personally, and to provide a leading ship having greater gun power on its (engaged) bow, the *Hartford* was placed second in line rather than first . . . much to Farragut's disgust. The *Hartford's* gunboat companion was the *Metacomet*. Both columns of ships were to pass around the east end of the mine-field, i. e., between it and Fort Morgan.

Early on the morning of August 5, 1864, the fleet got under way and soon firing commenced on both sides. Events proceeded according to plan; all of the Union ships had gotten within range; a gentle breeze was

blowing the smoke into the Confederate gunners. Suddenly those on the flagship were shocked to observe that the ship ahead of her was slowing down, the *Brooklyn*! In the word's of Farragut's Flag Lieutenant*: she "suddenly stopped, arresting the advance of the fleet. This threatened the most serious disaster, as the flood tide was sweeping the ships together in confusion under the guns of the Confederate batteries." Farragut [in the shrouds] hailed the deck to learn why the *Brooklyn* had stopped. "What's the matter with the *Brooklyn*?" he shouted, according to Loyal Farragut's biography of his father. He was told she had signalled that she was forging ahead of the monitors. He ordered a signal to be made to her to tell the monitors to go ahead, and to go ahead herself; this signal was made by (Army) Lieutenant Kinney by wigwags. Instead of going forward, the *Brooklyn* was soon seen to be backing, and in doing so her bow swung across the bow of the *Hartford*, closing the narrow passage to the east of the line of torpedoes. Farragut hailed again, and all that could be distinguished of her reply was "something about torpedoes." Hereupon Farragut gave vent to his most famous order: "Damn the torpedoes! Go ahead!" . . . this last directed to the *Hartford's* Engineer Officer. He ordered the *Metacomet* to back, and thus the pair succeeded in swinging to port and passing clear, under the *Brooklyn's* stern. It thus became no longer possible to get to the eastward of the mine-field, so the *Hartford* led the port column of ships over it, the *Brooklyn* falling in next astern of the *Hartford*. By the most extraordinary good fortune none of them suffered mishap. It is interesting to note that the *Brooklyn* stood into Mobile Bay that morning with a mine-sweeping rig on

*The late Rear Admiral J. C. Watson.

her bow that was quite ingenious for that day and age.

Meantime the Confederate ironclad *Tennessee* had crossed the unobstructed channel from east to west, and took up a position just behind the mine-field. The *Tecumseh*, in her eagerness to get at the enemy, neglected to hold her course past the buoy marking the eastern limits of the mines. Instead of leaving the buoy on the port hand she stood toward the *Tennessee* across the end of the field and was blown up with the loss of almost all hands. She was mined several minutes after the *Brooklyn* had begun to back down.

When the *Brooklyn* executed her historic maneuver at Mobile Bay to keep clear of the monitors, mines, or whatnot, she caused no damage but came exceedingly close to it.


CERVERA AND THE SECOND *Brooklyn*

The second *Brooklyn* was the beautiful three-stack armored cruiser built in the middle 'Nineties and saw service at Santiago in the War with Spain and at Vladivostok during and after World War I. It was her performance in the vicinity of Santiago which furnished a surprising succession of events consistently notorious. The first item or series of items had to do with the discovery of Cervera's squadron and the initial establishment of its blockade.

Cervera left the Cape Verdes April 29, 1898, and had thereupon lost himself to sight in the Atlantic; for, it must be remembered there was no wireless in those days. Sampson was in command of the U. S. naval forces in the North Atlantic and on May 19 was at Key West with most of his strength present or close by. Cervera's squadron was held in sufficiently low esteem by our strategists so that a very large part of the American fleet was split into a so-called "Flying Squadron" under Schley.

(Cervera's ships were evaluated a bit more correctly by the Navy Department than by the inhabitants of our Atlantic Coast cities who reacted to the Spaniards' westward approach in the same manner as they did some forty years later when Orson Wells' "Martians" reached these shores over the ether waves!) Schley's flagship was the *Brooklyn* with the battleships *Iowa*, *Massachusetts*, and *Texas*, and other lighter craft composing his main force. This left Sampson with a fleet headed by his flagship *New York*, which was somewhat similar to the *Brooklyn*. In addition he had the *Indiana*, *Oregon*, and various monitors, protected cruisers, etc.

Cervera stopped off Fort de France, Martinique, and at Curacao, from which places news of his presence leaked out. May 16 the *Colon*'s log reads in part: "2.30 p.m. flagship made signal: 'If you want a cow send boat.' Answered: 'Many thanks; do not require any.'" The Spanish squadron suddenly appeared off the entrance of Santiago de Cuba early on the morning of May 19 and entered the harbor minus one broken-down torpedo-boat destroyer which later limped into San Juan, Puerto Rico. Cervera could scarcely have picked a place with fewer facilities for serving his ships. Soon after the Spanish anchors were down, Secretary of the Navy Long received a report that Cervera had arrived at Santiago. Schley's Flying Squadron had departed Key West May 19 and Sampson was ordered to send a fast despatch vessel. Cables existed to such points as Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti, and Kingston, Jamaica. Two or three days must be allowed for the delivery of a message from, for example, Washington or Key West to a ship off the south coast of Cuba ordering him to proceed to Santiago, ascertain definitely whether or not Cervera was inside, and to blockade the entrance unless Cervera definitely was not there. For the first few



The second Brooklyn, Admiral Schley's flagship, an armored cruiser 400' long. She displaced 9 215 tons, and mounted eight 8" and twelve 5" guns in her main battery. Her armor belt was 3" in thickness. Seven Scotch boilers supplied steam to four triple-expansion engines in tandem on two shafts, each pair being connected by a coupling. They developed 18,769 IHP at 21.91 knots.

days the attempts to move Schley to Santiago were of various degrees of energy and positiveness on the part of both Long and Sampson. Moreover there are many conflicts in official documents as between those reported to have been sent by Long and Sampson, and those reported received by Schley. In order not to place any censure on the *Brooklyn* that is not due, I shall take Schley's version of the despatches in all particulars.

The Flying Squadron arrived off Cienfuegos May 21. No despatch vessel reached him from Key West until the next day, and the first order in connection with the contemplated move to Santiago was for Schley to remain at Cienfuegos for the time being. On May 23 Schley received orders from Sampson to move to Santiago if satisfied Cervera was not in Cienfuegos. He was not yet satisfied at that time but found out positively the next day that the Spaniards were not there, three days after his arrival! He sent a message to the Department that he would move "tomorrow" but he actually started that night. This was five days after the start of the attempts to move the Flying

Squadron to Santiago; but let us charge only a part of this delay to Schley.

The Department was becoming more certain of Cervera's presence at Santiago and the consequent necessity of blockading that port. The Flying Squadron had two colliers along with it but Schley found difficulty in taking coal from them because of the state of the sea plus handicaps of equipment. As a result there followed a most extraordinary interchange of cablegrams between Schley and his superiors, the latter bringing every possible pressure to bear in the strongest language to prevail upon Schley to go to *Santiago and stick*; he in turn replying to the effect that he must leave the vicinity and return to Key West to coal! It is difficult for one not actually reading the documents to believe that such a situation could have existed over a period of several days.

Schley reports: "Expect difficulty here [Cienfuegos] will be to coal from colliers in the constant heavy swell." Long: "All Department's information indicates Spanish division is still at Santiago. The Department looks to you to ascertain facts, and that

the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action." Schley: "Coaling off Cienfuegos is very uncertain. . . . I have ascertained the Spanish fleet is not here. I will move eastward tomorrow. On account of want of coal, I can not blockade." The water was not getting any smoother so the *Brooklyn* and her consorts were going to pull out for home while there was still enough coal in their bunkers to get all the way there without coaling. In effect the Spanish fleet could take care of itself.

Long: "The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know positively whether the Spanish division is in Santiago de Cuba harbor. . . . You must surmount difficulties regarding coaling by your own ingenuity and perseverance. This is a crucial time, and the Department relies upon you to give quickly information as to Cervera's presence. . . . Cervera must not be allowed to escape." Schley: "Have been unable absolutely to coal the *Texas*, *Marblehead*, *Vixen*, *Brooklyn* from collier all owing to very rough sea. . . . The *Brooklyn* alone has more than sufficient coal to proceed to Key West; can not remain off Santiago present state squadron coal account. . . . Much to be regretted can not obey orders of Department. Have striven earnestly; forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan passage. Can not ascertain anything respecting enemy position." Long: "Utmost urgency. Unless it is unsafe for your squadron Department wishes you to remain off Santiago. . . . You must not leave vicinity of Santiago unless it is unsafe your squadron."

But leave the vicinity of Santiago the *Brooklyn* and the other ships did—or, attempted. In accordance with Schley's earlier despatch the Flying Squadron had departed from Cienfuegos, arriving May 26 at a point twenty miles south of Santiago. Schley: "it appeared absolutely necessary to abandon the

position off Santiago and seek a place where the vessels could be coaled . . . as the prospect did not seem favorable for replenishing the meager coal supply of the other vessels, the squadron stood to the westward." The *Brooklyn* signalled: "Destination Key West via south side of Cuba and Yucatan channel." This move was explained by Schley in a later more full report in the following astounding paragraph: "Inasmuch as it was known that, in case the Spanish squadron had reached Santiago, Admiral Sampson was able to block any movement of the enemy through the Bahama Channel, my intention in standing to the westward was, should it become necessary, to bar any effort of the enemy to reach Havana by a dash through the Yucatan Passage." The consummation of this rare piece of strategy was prevented by an accident which occurred most opportunely. The collier *Merrimac*, soon to be Hobson's block ship, carried away her IP valve stem and cracked the stuffing box. The first attempts to get her in tow required approximately 24 hours. As it happened, before the squadron had gotten any appreciable distance away from Santiago, the sea moderated, coaling was resumed and repairs made. Thus was the *Brooklyn* saved from a still blacker mark.

Long to Sampson: "Schley has not ascertained whether the Spanish division is at Santiago de Cuba." Sampson replied, "Schley to blockade the Spanish squadron at all hazards and to take every necessary measure to prevent egress. . . . He has sufficient coal aboard, undoubtedly, to keep sea for sometime, as all except the *Iowa* left here full. [Key West]. The importance of absolutely preventing the departure of Spanish squadron of paramount importance." Also: "Try to hold [Schley] by telegraph." And: "The failure of Schley to continue blockade must be remedied at once if possible." This

Sampson proposed to do himself by leaving the Key West-Havana area with his squadron, proceeding around Cape Antonio, stopping Schley when encountered, and forcing him to turn back to Santiago. Meanwhile, however, Schley had finally been prevailed upon to blockade the port. Long: "Hold on at all hazards." So the blockade was at last established May 29.

However, by this time ten days had passed since Cervera's arrival at Santiago, about which the Department has received only unconfirmed reports. Long: "It is your duty to ascertain immediately if the Spanish fleet is in Santiago and report. Would be discreditable to the Navy if that fact were not ascertained immediately. All military and naval movements depend upon that point." That morning Schley discovered two of the Spanish cruisers and the two destroyers, and so reported to the Department. Later in the day a third cruiser was definitely sighted but not reported. Therefore — Long: "Where are the other two armored cruisers, Spanish fleet?" Also: "Sagua, 25 miles east of Santiago, is reported a good place for landing, and that the insurgents have entire possession of this vicinity, and some horses of their cavalry are kept about a mile inland. From there it has been reported easy to reach the heights in the rear of Santiago, commanding view of the whole harbor." Schley: "Have seen one more vessel of the *Viscaya* class in port." Cervera would have done well if he had kept his ships out of sight; apparently he failed to realize the concern he was causing the Americans.

Upon receipt of the word from Schley about sighting the first four Spanish ships, Sampson was ordered to Santiago with the *New York*, *Oregon* and others. Rounding Cape Maysi he reached Santiago early on June 1. Two days later, eight days after Schley's arrival, he was able to report: "Some

observations made today ... made four armored vessels and two torpedo destroyers at Santiago." Thus ended the first act of the vagaries of the second *Brooklyn*.

THE FAMOUS TURN

The next *Brooklyn* incident was a briefer one, and is better known to readers of naval history. So far as the heavy ships are concerned, the stations in the semicircular blockade of the Santiago harbor entrance were as follows, reading from west to east: *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, *Oregon*, *New York*, and *Indiana*. (The coast runs almost due east and west at this point.) Cervera came out about 0935 on Sunday, July 3. It so happened that the *Massachusetts* had left for Guantanamo Bay at 4 a.m. to coal, eliminating her from the forthcoming action. Sampson's flagship *New York* had, by chance, left her station three quarters of an hour before the first Spanish ship appeared. She was bound eastward for Siboney, ten miles away, for a conference between Sampson and the general commanding the land forces beleaguering Santiago. Since the Spanish ships turned due west as soon as they emerged, the *New York* did not become engaged. She was under way with more steam raised than the other U. S. ships, but the few additional miles she had placed between herself and the Morro were too much to make up before the succeeding chase was over. Accordingly the American line from west to east was: *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Iowa*, *Oregon*, and *Indiana*. The *Brooklyn* stood two miles from the nearest point on the coast and this, in turn, was about two miles west of the harbor entrance. Deep water existed almost to the beach, and it was through this opening between the *Brooklyn* and the coast that the Spanish ships attempted to escape.

The course of Cervera's squadron was

evident soon after they appeared. All the American ships were hove to, not anchored, and their headings were various, although only that of the *Texas* was many degrees from north; she was heading more or less east when general quarters was sounded. As the blockaders' engines slowly started to turn over, all the ships swung to port, toward the Spaniards, in an attempt to block their passage or to close them as much as possible. That is, all did so except the *Brooklyn*! Her heading had been almost ideal in that it was a little to the west of the spot on the coast nearest to her. Her position was such that she could have engaged even the leading enemy ships at as short a range as she might desire. Only the *Brooklyn* was in position to do this. Instead of doing what the other ships did, she fired a few rounds to starboard, and then swung around to starboard. After firing to port she finally made almost a complete circle before squaring away to the westward on a course parallel to the enemy. This extraordinary maneuver is the *Brooklyn's* famous circle to starboard which has become historic.

The first result was immediate and not far from being disastrous. The *Texas*, next in line, had swung around to port and, together with the other ships, was attempting to close the enemy on a slightly converging course. Suddenly the *Brooklyn* came around toward her and headed to cross her bows from starboard to port on almost a collision course. The *Texas* had to back all her engines full. Thus the *Brooklyn's* performance not only endangered two of the five American ships, but delayed the *Texas* appreciably. Instead of getting into a position where no Spanish ship could possibly have broken away with impunity, the *Brooklyn* fell miles astern of the fleeing *Colon* before working up to speed; thus essentially she was no better off than some of the rest.

THE CHASE

The Spanish ships had exceeded 20 knots on their trials, but their engineering plants were now in poor repair, it was later discovered. The American battleships were 17-knot vessels and the *Brooklyn* was a 21-knot ship. On her trials she had averaged 21.9 knots for 4 hours but was very light on that occasion. During the ensuing battle all but one of the Spanish ships were destroyed before working up to full speed or covering any appreciable distance from the harbor mouth. The one exception was the *Colon* which did get out in front for a few brief hours. She succeeded in doing so by reason, first, of the *Brooklyn's* circling turn as already described and, second, due to a short burst of speed after building up her fires. She alone was equipped with boilers in which steam could be raised quickly, not being fitted with Scotch boilers as were the other ships on both sides. Thus, from 10:30 to 11:05 a.m., for instance, she averaged 19 knots and drew away from her pursuers. At that point, however, her best coal ran out, her fires presumably got dirty, and she was done.

In the meanwhile, the *Indiana* and *Iowa* got off behind the rest, and when the fate of the next to last Spanish ship was sealed, they were ordered to desist from the pursuit. The *Texas* did very well in spite of the initial check she received as a result of having to back her engines to avoid the *Brooklyn*. The *Oregon* did much better, though carrying 600 tons of coal over normal. But what was the matter with the *Brooklyn*? It is true that she squared away to the westward a shade ahead of the *Oregon* and the rest, in spite of that notorious circle. But the *Oregon* hung onto her quarter all the way, and the *Texas* lost but a trifle in the 3-hour straightaway race. The primary reason for this was the unreadiness of her



The third and latest Brooklyn of World War II fame. Length, 614'; displacement, 10,000 standard; eight water-tube boilers; four turbine-driven screws; 100,000 HP. Mounting fifteen 6" and eight 5" guns, she is rated as a light cruiser, but her armor belt of 5" is thicker than that of her armored cruiser predecessor.

boilers. El Caney and San Juan Hill had fallen to our land forces on July 1, making imminent the capture of Santiago. Cervera thus was certain to come out soon afterward, which he did two days later. When he appeared, only three of the *Brooklyn's* five double-ended boilers were on the line. Both of the others were secured and *one was empty and open!* Her two single-ended boilers were secured, and one of these was empty and open. Small wonder that she never reached even 16 knots; by her own report: "nearly 16." Before the *Colon* headed for the beach the *Brooklyn* had gotten another double-ended boiler and a single-ended one onto the line; but the others, which had been open at the start, furnished no steam to the engines.

The *Brooklyn* (also the *New York*) had twin screws driven by four engines in tandem pairs with a coupling between each pair. Both forward engines of the *Brooklyn* were uncoupled when Cervera emerged, and the entire pursuit was carried on with the after engines alone. This condition was not nearly so reprehensible, however, as it would have been if all boiler power had been on the line. Since only half was, the after engines alone

could handle all the steam that could be supplied. As additional boilers were cut in, additional engines were desirable. Stopping to couple the forward engines would have caused the ship to lose a great deal of ground. The *Brooklyn* had three quarters of her boiler power on the line before the end. If the *Colon* had continued to gain, even with more of the *Brooklyn's* boilers being cut in, it would have been necessary very soon to stop, couple the forward engines, and then work up to speed again. If the Spanish ships had been able even to approach their trial speeds, as was at least considered possible, the *Brooklyn* and the *New York* were the only ships able to overtake them.

HAS THE THIRD *Brooklyn* BROKEN THE JINX?

Launched, appropriately enough, at the Brooklyn Navy Yard in 1936, the third and last *Brooklyn* has apparently from the start set out to break the jinx which has unfortunately marked the careers of her predecessors. She passed her initial tests and trials without mishap, and at the beginning of the last world conflict she was assigned to patrol duty near Martinique where she was soon

credited with the *probable* sinking of an Axis submarine. By this indecisive action many of the crew undoubtedly believed that this might be the prelude to other events of the type which had always seemed to hound the *Brooklyns*. If such thoughts did exist they were soon to be dispelled however, because she shortly thereafter, while on convoy duty in the Atlantic, began to add fame to her heretofore doubtful good name. Her first opportunity suddenly presented itself when she was frantically signalled by a burning transport in need of immediate assistance. The *Brooklyn* braved rough seas and fires to twice come alongside and remove 1300 passengers and most of the crew of the distressed ship.

She took an active part in the landings in North Africa, especially those around Fedala and Casablanca. At the latter place during action with the French fleet she received her only damage of the war when a shell ricocheted from her deck and landed in the sea *without exploding*. This was a good omen indeed.

Again, as though Fate had thrown a protective arm over her, she made a miraculous escape from a submarine. The captain of the latter had surfaced his ship within good range of the *Brooklyn*, fired a spread of five torpedoes for a sure hit, then quickly submerged to await the expected explosions.

The *Brooklyn* sighted the wakes of the torpedoes and by the greatest skill and good luck managed to evade all five. The jinx had undoubtedly been broken.

She continued to perform mission after mission with success in every instance. She took part in numerous landings during the Italian Campaign, and for a time she was the major American ship in the Mediterranean. She went through extremely heavy aerial attacks and always came through unscratched. Her accurate antiaircraft fire on several occasions stopped the bomb runs of torpedo planes. In actions during the invasion of southern France she was bombarded by shore batteries and attacked by bombers and fighters but never sustained even the slightest damage. For a time she had the honor of being the flagship of Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, who at the time was commanding the Eighth Fleet.

At the close of hostilities she was in an American port preparing for another war cruise and would probably have continued to serve with brilliant battle distinction. In answer to the question of whether the jinx has been broken, her captain and crew can proudly point to the record which shows that during the career of the third *Brooklyn* not a single American life was lost in combat and no major damage was suffered.

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NAVAL OPERATIONS ARTICLE, PART III

Part III of the article, "The Development of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations," by Dr. Henry P. Beers, is scheduled for publication in the summer 1947 issue of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*.

The first two parts, which appeared in the spring and fall issues of 1946, brought the account up to the period of World War I. In the third part the expansion of the organization during that war and the post-war period is treated extensively.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

Joint Session with the American Historical Association

The American Military Institute held a joint session with the American Historical Association at the Hotel Pennsylvania in New York on December 28, 1946. The program was a round-table discussion of problems of method encountered in writing military history at close quarters with the events.

The leaders were historians who are writing the history of World War II. Dr. Hugh M. Cole and Dr. Wesley Frank Craven represented the War Department, Lt. Comdr. Henry Salomon, Jr., the Navy, Dr. Joel D. Thacker the Marine Corps, and Dr. Frederic C. Lane the Maritime Commission. Dr. J. Phinney Baxter presided. Each speaker presented a problem for debate, and the general discussion was lively. A widely representative audience, numbering approximately three hundred, attended the session which exhibited an encouraging expression of interest in military history.

Dr. Cole discussed several problems in connection with the writing of military operational history. He stressed the need for early decision as to the level at which the operational historian will write, i.e. whether at the level of the division or at the lower levels of regiment, battalion, or company. He mentioned the difficult decision that the military historian must make as to the type of audience he should try to reach, whether he should present operations for popular consumption or for a more thoughtful reader who will be satisfied only with a sophisticated and somewhat detailed presentation of complex opera-

tional matters. He discussed, too, both the necessity for and the difficulties in the use of interview material to supplement the written record.

Dr. Craven spoke of the problems of adjustment which confront the historian from academic life when he dons a uniform and seeks at once to learn, as well as record, the activities of a military headquarters. Dr. Lane pointed out that the official historian, however complete his freedom of research and access to records, is required to satisfy the definite needs of a governmental agency, and is in danger of losing sight of the fact that administrative history, however useful, is not history in the Thucydidean sense.

Commander Salomon elaborated peculiar problems in the evaluation of certain categories of naval operational documents. Dr. Thacker discussed the difficulties shared by so many historians because of a late start. In the early days of the war, preoccupation with current problems caused many an official to feel that the establishment of an organization to write the history of his activity could always be deferred until some later time. The failure to have historians in the picture early not only delayed completion of the various historical projects but was responsible for the failure to take adequate steps to preserve important material of the earlier period.

In the discussion which followed these presentations, other questions were raised among which were the following. What should both government agencies and professional historians do in order to be ready to start the historical coverage of another con-

flict at the very outset? The mobilization plans of the Historical Division of the War Department were outlined to suggest some steps which might be and are being taken. Another question was whether official historians are attempting to write the story of the war too soon, before all the records are available and before more mature judgments can be formed. To this the answer seemed to lie in the motto of the War Department Historical Division: "Now or Never." Some of the audience were also interested to learn whether government historians are having any difficulty in securing full and free use of records. In this respect none of the many government historians present indicated any difficulties.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES MEETING

At an important meeting on March 7, the Board of Trustees of the American Military Institute accepted with regret the resignation of three officers: Dr. Dallas Irvine, Provost; Dr. Stuart Portner, Editor; and Mr. Leo L. Gerald, Treasurer. Both Dr. Irvine and Dr. Portner have served throughout the difficult war years, and all pleaded the press of other business. Dr. Irvine, who has served as the intellectual proctor of the society and its publication since 1935 and is the only person who has held the office of Provost, has recently been appointed Director of Photography in the National Archives, but it is hoped that he will still have time to continue his interest in military history and the affairs of the Institute. In accepting his resignation, the Board decided not to fill the office for the time being.

Three other vacancies among the officers already existed. Brigadier General Donald Armstrong, following his retirement as Commandant of the Army Industrial College, felt that his time in Washington would be too limited and his new activities too demanding

for him to continue as President. His resignation was reluctantly accepted by the Board of Trustees at its previous meeting on October 28, effective December 31 of last year, and at this meeting the Board decided to leave the presidency vacant also for the present. Colonel Joseph I. Greene, our Vice President and Editor of *Infantry Journal*, will continue to act as President. Major Maynard G. Moyer, Membership Secretary, was forced to resign last year because of a permanent change of station to Yale University, and the Secretary, Mr. Thurman S. Wilkins, left for the West coast in January to continue his studies at the University of California. For a short while the pre-war secretary, Mr. Frederick P. Todd, assumed the secretarial duties.

The Board of Trustees has now appointed Mr. Riley Sunderland as Secretary, Major Robert de T. Lawrence as Editor, and Mr. George J. Stansfield as Treasurer. All three are members of the War Department Historical Division. Mr. Sunderland, who studied at the University of Chicago, served overseas with the Historical Section of the India-Burma Theater at New Delhi and Calcutta. His writings in military history include a history of the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill. Major Lawrence was until recently Editor of *Air Force* magazine, the official journal of the Army Air Forces which ceased publication last year. Mr. Stansfield assumed the duties of Treasurer in addition to the office of Librarian, which he has filled for several years.

As its Executive Committee, which meets throughout the year and governs the Institute between full Board meetings, the Board of Trustees appointed Colonel Greene, Dr. Luther Evans, and Colonel John M. Kemper. The new Committee was specifically charged with two important tasks. First, it is to explore the several avenues leading

toward the establishment of a full-time, paid staff. Secondly, it was asked to investigate and report upon the advisability of increasing the cost of membership dues and subscriptions. It is hardly necessary to point out that the cost of publication has been rising steadily, and the membership will probably have to decide how to meet the problem. Changing the amount of the dues cannot be done without amending the by-laws, which can be accomplished only by the members. This is likely to mean that no change could be made effective before 1948.

The new Editor will guide the future of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* with the aid of an Editorial Board, which will replace the former Editorial Advisors and Editorial Staff. Already selected by Major Lawrence and approved by the Board of Trustees are Lieutenant Colonel Jesse S. Douglas, Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Lieutenant Commander Robert M. Lunney, Captain William M. Mettler, Dr. Albert F. Simpson, and Mr. Frederick P. Todd.

ARMY HISTORICAL PROGRAM

The War Department Historical Division has published two more of its *American Forces in Action Series* since the first of the year, *Small Unit Actions* and *St-Lo* (7 July-19 July 1944), both in the same format as *Omaha Beachhead*. With *The Admiralties*, *Guam*, and *The Capture of Makin*, all published last November, twelve studies in this series have now been issued.

The historical section of the Army Air Forces has recently been reorganized. Now known as the Air Historical Office, it is still headed by Colonel Wilfred J. Paul. Dr. Albert F. Simpson, formerly historian of the Mediterranean Air Service Command, is the new Air Historian, succeeding Colonel Clanton W. Williams, who has returned to the University of Alabama. The office has been

organized into two branches, the Historical Studies and Editorial Branch under Dr. Thomas H. Greer and the Sources and Reference Branch under Dr. Chauncey E. Sanders. Lieutenant Colonel Garth C. Cobb remains as executive officer.

The first publication of the Air Historical Office available to the public, *The Official Pictorial History of the AAF*, has just appeared. Frankly popular, it covers the development of military aeronautics from the balloons of the Civil War to the B-29's of the Twentieth Air Force. The projected seven-volume *Official History of the AAF in World War II*, a cooperative venture under the general editorship of Dr. Wesley F. Craven of New York University and Dr. James L. Cate of the University of Chicago, is coming along nicely with the first volume about ready for the printer.

As a step toward encouraging the offering of college courses in problems of national security, the War Department has been persuaded to allow credit for such courses toward ROTC requirements. This policy was adopted at the suggestion of several leading educators who believe that such courses should be given and argued that allowing ROTC credit would encourage civilian scholars to enter the field. The Navy Department has followed this policy for some time.

NAVAL HISTORY

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King was elected President of the Naval Historical Foundation at its annual membership meeting held in Washington on November 22. Admiral King succeeds Admiral Joseph Strauss, who has served as President of the Foundation since 1943.

Captain Samuel Eliot Morison's *Operations in North African Waters: October 1942-June 1943* was published in February by Atlantic-Little, Brown as volume II of

the projected fourteen volume *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*. As the first volume of the series to appear, it has already attracted wide attention because of the author and the method of publication. Published as an unofficial account, it is generally known that Dr. Morison is the Office of Naval History's historian for military operations.

On the administrative side, under the direction of Dr. Robert G. Albion, the Office of Naval History has published a *Glossary of U. S. Naval Abbreviations, World War II*, which will be of great assistance to future students. Issued in multilithed form, it concentrates on vessel types, naval aircraft types, commissioned and enlisted personnel designations, and FPO numbers in use from 1940 through 1946.

The Historical Section of the Marine Corps has been transferred to the Division of Public Information, of which Brigadier General W. E. Riley is Director. Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., is now in charge of the section, which is charged with maintenance of the Marine Corps archives as well as its historical activities. Three preliminary monographs have been issued in limited printings during the past quarter: *The Sixth Marine Division*, one of the series of official histories of major units; *The First Marine Division on Okinawa* and *The Campaign for the Marianas*, for the series covering individual operations. After these have been criticized in their present form, they will be revised and published for general distribution.

NAVAL HISTORICAL MEETING

At the invitation of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, representatives of twenty-six learned societies, the State Department, the War Department, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, the Military and Naval Academies,

and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces met in the Navy Department on March 8, 1947, under the auspices of the Office of Naval History. The principal purpose of the meeting was to stimulate an interest among professional historians in the writing of naval history.

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz welcomed the guests for Mr. Forrestal. He asked that the historians assume responsibility for studying trends in the recent policies of the great powers so that these trends may be projected into the future in order that planning may be made to meet any exigency.

Captain John B. Heffernan, Director of Naval History, introduced speakers at the morning session who acquainted the visitors with the Navy's program and pointed out the need for continuing the study and writing of naval history beyond that planned under the present program. The facilities by which the Navy could contribute to this effort and the problems that would arise were also discussed.

The afternoon session consisted of a roundtable discussion which was devoted largely to the role that graduate students could play. Dr. Guy Stanton Ford, Secretary of the American Historical Association, suggested that the Office of Naval History prepare a list of appropriate thesis topics. Dr. Albion mentioned the possibility of having Ph.D. candidates serve internships in the Office of Naval History, an arrangement that would "kill two birds with one stone" by supplying the Navy with needed studies and the students with their theses.

The meeting was concluded at a dinner at the Army and Navy Club. The speaker of the evening was Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, who urged that the professional historian make full use of the material available to him. Admiral King concluded, "Historians know best that the experiences of the past offer sure guide-posts for the future."

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

THE CASE OF THE "FIGHTING IRISH":

An Illustration of American Indifference to Regimental Traditions¹

Much emphasis was put on morale by the United States Army during World War II. Vast sums were spent on information services, moving pictures, entertainment troupes, and little comforts for the men. In all this hullabaloo over maintenance of morale, however, the War Department showed marked inconsistency. One of the greatest of all morale stimulants, *esprit de corps*, was overlooked. In fact it was deliberately discarded. Some authorities have claimed that *esprit de corps* is impossible to attain in a conscripted army, yet experience does not bear this out. The United States Marine Corps has long been known as the foremost exponent of *esprit de corps*. By the close of the war fully half of the Corps was made up of draftees, yet there was no let down in *esprit*. Young marines were ferociously proud of their uniform and their service, regardless of how they entered the Corps.

Persons versed in military history know that the United States Army had within its ranks certain units with as proud and distinguished lineage as the Marine Corps, but by a process which began in 1917, this pride in belonging to old line units was deliberately submerged for the sake of efficiency in paper

work. Such units as the 2nd Pennsylvania, 21st Michigan, 4th Alabama, and 7th New York were hidden under the unimaginative Army numbering systems, and little reference was ever made to the records some of the units had built up. Indifference to *esprit de corps* can at times be displayed in a positive fashion, as this story will show.

One of the more famous of American fighting units was the old 69th New York Infantry. Redesignated the 165th Infantry during the First World War, it fought in the 42nd, or Rainbow Division. The organization of this Division was one of the few steps taken at that time which showed we had any serious idea of *esprit de corps*. The 69th had a long and illustrious record. It claims more battle rings on its flags than any other unit in the United States Army. It fought at Gettysburg, Antietam and St. Mihiel; one company of the regiment even dates back to the Revolution. The 69th New York was a New York City regiment and has long called itself "New York's Own." During the Civil War it was made up entirely of the then predominant Irish population of Manhattan's lower East Side. It has remained Irish in character to this day. The Gaelic antecedents of its men has long been its chief source of pride. The biggest day of the year for these men has always been March 17th. They have been for years the center

¹Contribution by the Historical Officer, 27th Infantry Division, who observed the 165th Infantry Regiment at first hand on Saipan and Okinawa.

about which New York City's great St. Patrick's Day celebration has whirled. Whenever they march on parade it is always to the tune of Irish music, jigs and ballads rewritten into stirring marches. No officer or enlisted man ever thought of leaving the 69th; once a member of the regiment, he stayed a member until he died. Every son of a New York Irishman was almost automatically "recruited" for the regiment as soon as he was born. From the commander to the lowest ranking private, they were fiercely proud of the unit and of its history. For years, in New York, the regimental commander has borne on his automobile license plates the number "69 NY," and the wish most often expressed by its officers was to command the regiment before they died.

In the regrouping of 1939 the 165th Infantry became a part of the 27th Division, the New York National Guard. In October 1940 it was called into Federal Service and in March 1942 it went overseas as part of the first combat division to leave the United States for the Pacific. In 1943 the regiment captured Makin. Their regimental commander, Col. Gardiner Conroy, was killed in this engagement, but the men, who carried a shamrock flag into battle along with the national Colors, cleaned up the atoll quickly. The commander who succeeded Col. Conroy, Col. Jerry Kelley, received the DSO from King George VI and the regiment was commended for a brilliant victory.

Seven months later the 165th Infantry, a harp painted on the bumper of every vehicle, landed at Saipan in the middle of the night. In a brilliant thrust and with heavy fighting they captured Aslito Airfield; cutting the island in half thirty-six hours after they went into the line. They received their second commendation from Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith for this feat. The 165th Infantry never came out of the line on Saipan,

except to move from one front to another. It served for twenty-five days of bitter, slug-ging battle. It gained more ground and captured more important installations than any other comparable unit, Army or Marine, on the Island. When the fighting was over, the Marines had redubbed the regiment the "165th Marines" out of respect for the great fighting qualities shown in the struggle.

Again on Okinawa the 165th Infantry took part in heavy fighting. Its third regimental commander, Col. Joseph Timothy Hart, a red headed Irishman from Queens, led his men in the reduction of Item Pocket. On April 30, after ten days in the line, the 165th finally came out with its companies down to thirty men, but showing a greater gain of ground than any other regiment on Okinawa during a like period.

Throughout the war the 165th kept their pride in their regiment. They always referred to themselves as the "69th," they carried their shamrock flags, they talked in a deep, rich brogue, and they let no one stand in doubt that they were the "Fighting Irish." The 1st Battalion was commanded by Jerry Kelley and Jim Mahoney. The 2nd Battalion was commanded by John McDonough until he was wounded, then by Denis Claire, Jim Dooley, and Ben Ryan. The 3rd Battalion had, at one time or another, Joseph Timothy Hart, Denny Claire, Martin Foery, and finally Herman Lutz, always fondly known as "Herman the German." The company commanders included an O'Brien, two Ryans, a Kennedy, a Gallagher, a McManus, a Kiley, a Potter, and a Tuohy, among others. For some little time, under the command of General Haskell, all incoming 27th Division replacements were screened to take out the Irish names, whose owners were then sent off to the 165th Infantry. Under later generals this practice was discontinued so that by the time the regiment reached Okinawa, it con-

tained a good sprinkling of Greenbergs, Malinskis, and just plain Bentons.

Most of the *esprit de corps*, even under the earlier generals of the 27th Division, was generated from within the regiment itself by the survivors of the Old Guard. As battles reduced the number of these older members, the *esprit* went down accordingly. No effort was made by Division headquarters to indoctrinate the men in the history and pride of the regiment. By the end of the Okinawa campaign, most of the magnificent *esprit* of the unit was being carried on by the older men, now an experienced, battle hardened, and efficient group of officers and non-coms. Although most of them had been overseas for four years and were due for rotation, the opinion expressed by the majority was that they would rather stay on with the regiment and come home with it. This meant facing the invasion of Japan itself, a long and hard campaign. But the love of these men for their old 69th made them willing to forego their transfer back to the States. It promised to furnish a core of seasoned men, sorely needed in the 27th Division,

then being rebuilt to compensate for the tremendous battle losses it had suffered on Okinawa, and for the point system which had sent home all but 2,600 men.

However, the new general had other ideas. He had assumed command of the Division after the ugly "Smith versus Smith" affair on Saipan and it was his idea that all of the old must go. He put pressure on the older officers and men to leave, and finally, in July 1945, replaced Colonel Hart with a Regular Army officer with a distinctly non-Gaelic name. The next day a Division order was issued: no longer would press releases refer to the 165th as the "Fighting Irish." The effect of the order was instantaneous. As fast as they could, the remainder of the Old Guard took their rotation. On V-J Day there was not a single officer or man left in the regiment from the old hell-for-leather outfit. The splendid *esprit de corps* which had carried the 69th New York through Gettysburg, Antietam, St. Mihiel, and Saipan was gone. All that remained was another colorless, inexperienced regiment of draftees.

EDMUND G. LOVE

"... WITH BAYONETS FIXED, DRUMS BEATING, AND COLOURS FLYING"

In a colorful ceremony on March 14, 1946, the Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses of the Borough of Southampton, England, conferred upon the 14th Major Port of the Transportation Corps of the United States Army a rare privilege. It was given in recognition of the "outstanding achievement of all ranks of that formation" in the operation of the Port of Southampton during the Second World War. The principal figures at the ceremony were the Mayor of the Town, Mr. Harry Vincent, and Colonel Sherman

L. Kiser, Port Commander.

In traditional robes and wig the Town Clerk read the terms of the presentation from a parchment scroll. In front of him stood the Town Sergeants bearing the golden maces of the city. Beyond these, in the forecourt of Southampton's Civic Center, the troops of the American command listened to the honor being conferred upon them: "The privilege, honour, and distinction of marching through the streets of the Town and County of the Town of Southampton



Colonel Sherman L. Kiser and Mr. Harry Vincent at dinner following presentation of the scroll. In the foreground are the official insignias of the City of Southampton


with bayonets fixed, drums beating, and colours flying."

The 14th Major Port was the first military organization to be so honored by Southampton. At that time not even the local regiment could unfurl its flags in the Town. But before the actual "freedom" could be tendered, the American troops had to march through Bargate, the massive, battlemented gate which once pierced the ancient walls of the city. Its archways, for years sealed against damage from bombing, were opened for the occasion.

The 14th Major Port had been a huge and bustling installation during the days of the war. At one time or another, 23,000 men had been attached to it for duty. Among its units had been numerous port, harbor

craft and quartermaster truck companies, three hospital trains and other medical units, and six AAA battalions. For some time its guard fuctions were performed by the 29th Infantry Regiment. But by March 1946 most of its units and its veteran hands had returned home, and arranging details of the ceremonial parade required considerable ingenuity.

The Port had neither drums nor drummers. Six side and two bass drums had to be borrowed from a neighboring British unit, together with one of its musicians as instructor. The National and Transportation Corps colors were carried. After the ceremony, with colors furled and cased, drums stilled, and rifles unbayoneted the American column marched up to the line of the city walls



The original Casilly Adams paintings of the Last Stand reproduced from a photograph filed when a copyright was issued to John G. Garber, 1886

at Bargate. There it halted, colors were shaken out and bayonets were fixed. Then with a brave crash of drums the troops stepped off and passed under the old, pointed archway into the Town of Southampton. The privilege had been exercised.

Today the 14th Major Port has been disbanded. Most of its units have disappeared from Army rolls, and the rare privilege, offered not as a publicity gesture by Southampton but as an act of genuine appreciation and friendliness, is threatened with following them into obscurity. It seems unfortunate that the Army cannot keep alive this privilege by transferring it officially to a live organization that once formed part of the Port. In view of the international aspect the transfer might well be effected by Presidential or Congressional enactment. The 29th Infantry is at present inactive, but certainly some of the other units are going concerns in the Regular or Reserve components of the Army. The original scroll—an impressive document, beautifully illuminated with the arms of Southampton—is in the custody of the Chief of Transportation. Here is a small but important spark of international friendliness; it would cost the Army nothing to keep it glowing.

FREDERICK P. TODD

THE BAR ROOM CUSTER

On June 14, 1946, the Cassilly Adams painting of "Custer's Last Stand," sometime presented by Adolphus Busch of the Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association to the 7th U. S. Cavalry, was destroyed in a fire at the Fort Bliss (Texas) Officers' Club. A few months later articles appeared simultaneously by Dr. Robert Taft in *The Kansas Historical Quarterly*,¹ and by Don Russell in *The Westerners Brand Book of Chicago*,² discussing Cassilly Adams' famous painting. Both investigators had discovered that the lithograph that used to appear in every American

bar room was not, in fact, produced from Adams' work, but from a re-painting of it by F. Otto Becker for the Milwaukee Lithographing Company in 1896. And both exploded some further myths about the painting.

Cassilly Adams (born July 18, 1843, at Cincinnati, Ohio, died May 8, 1921, at Indianapolis, Indiana) came of a family with a considerable artistic background. He maintained studios first in Cincinnati and later in St. Louis where the Custer was painted. It was copyrighted April 26, 1886, at which time it was being used as a traveling exhibition. A descriptive souvenir pamphlet, apparently prepared for use with the exhibition, was also filed for copyright. The painting then became involved in the affairs of a saloon and was seized for a debt due the brewing company, after which Mr. Busch presented it to the 7th. Neither investigator was able to clear up dates or details at this point.

It is known that the Becker re-painting, which differs in numerous details from that of Adams, was done in 1895 and entered for copyright in 1896. Some 150,000 copies of the lithograph were distributed, both before and after Prohibition. The original Adams picture was lost from about 1898, when the 7th Cavalry left for the Spanish-American War, to 1921, and was not actually recovered by the regiment until 1934 when it was taken out of storage and re-stored by the W.P.A.

Both writers append lists of other pictures of the Custer fight, and each has some titles not named by the other. Surprisingly the total comes to about fifty.

PETER CASWELL

¹Robert Taft, "The Pictorial Record of the Old West, IV: Custer's Last Stand—John Mulvany, Cassilly Adams and Otto Becker," in *The Kansas Historical Quarterly*, XIV (November 1946), pp. 361-390.

²Don Russell, "Sixty Years in Bar Rooms; or 'Custer's Last Fight,'" in *The Westerners Brand Book*, III (November 1946), 61 ff.

MUSEUM OF THE WASHINGTON LIGHT INFANTRY, CHARLESTON, S. C.

On the second floor of its armory, 240 King Street, Charleston, the Washington Light Infantry maintains its unit museum. The collection is distributed around a spacious lounge and reception room, furnished with comfortable couches, easy chairs and atmosphere in the best tradition of the metropolitan National Guard organization. Here are housed relics and battle trophies that date from every war in America's history.¹

A guncase contains 120 Springfield rifles, the first arms issued the company following the War between the States. In 1875, at a time when it was still forbidden to bear arms, the W.L.I. was asked to represent the State of South Carolina at the Celebration of the centenal of Bunker Hill. In the face of much harsh criticism throughout the South, the company accepted the invitation—replying to its critics that a unit which had maintained three full companies on the Confederate firing line for four years could afford to follow its own judgment about accepting the proffered brotherly hand of the North. The W.L.I. borrowed Winchester rifles from the Charleston Police Department for the occasion.

The 1875 trip was a success and led to a second invitation to come to Philadelphia for a larger celebration the next year. Again the matter of arms came up and the company's newly acquired Northern friends induced Congress to authorize, April 27, 1876, the loan of 160 of the latest design Army Springfields. With these it paraded on July 4. Upon its return home, after it had returned two cases of the rifles—40 pieces—and was cleaning and packing the remainder,

a politico-race riot broke out in the city. The W.L.I. was called out; it responded, carrying the borrowed weapons without ammunition. Ammunition had never been a part of the transaction and the men were prepared to rely on their bayonets, bluff, and a few personally owned pistols. Moving down Meeting Street the company met a detachment of Regulars doubletiming in the same direction. The volunteers halted and presented arms, uncertain as to the protocol of the moment. The Regulars halted also; the officers held a rapid conference following which the sum total of cartridges was split fifty-fifty and the two units moved off toward the disturbance.

The story of the rifles does not end here. The company wanted to retain them while the Army sued for their return. At length in 1878, after persuasion from sources in the North, Congress formally presented them to the W.L.I. The company still retains some of the ammunition it secured on the streets of Charleston.

Colors and standards on display in the museum date back to the early days of the unit and include several carried by its personnel in the Confederate service. The celebrated Eutaw flag, originally the standard of Lt. Col. William Washington's dragoons in the American Revolution and traditionally made by that officer's fiancée (and later wife) out of a red damask drapey, is not normally displayed. It is kept in a bank vault and cannot be removed unless a commissioned officer of the company is present.²

¹Most are listed in *Relics, Mementos, etc., of the Washington Light Infantry, Charleston, S. C., Displayed at Their Armory* (Charleston, 1932).

²The flag has been pictured in several publications: Gherardi Davis, *Regimental Colors in the War of the Revolution* (New York, 1907), p. 17; *The National Geographic Magazine*, LXVI (September, 1934), p. 371; etc.—Ed.

Around the walls hang pictures and documents which reflect the history and traditions of the corps. It was founded in 1807 in the alarm following the *Leopard-Chesapeake* affair. It was mustered into public service during the War of 1812 but saw no fighting. It served in the Seminole War in 1836, and in the Mexican War the company furnished elements of the South Carolina Palmetto Regiment.

The War between the States offers an illustration of how the Volunteer Militia of that day could be effectively expanded. The W.L.I. furnished three full companies of South Carolina infantry, the first of which entered the Hampton Legion as Company A, Infantry. After this conflict, in 1866, the survivors organized the W.L.I. Charitable Association, and in 1871 a Rifle Club. In this way the corps' spirit was kept alive until the organization was reconstituted as a military company.

The unit served on the Mexican Border as Company B, 2nd South Carolina Infantry, and in the First World War as the 105th Ammunition Train, 55th Field Artillery Brigade, 30th Infantry Division. It was engaged at St. Mihiel, the Meuse-Argonne, and in the defense of Toul. Today the organization is Company B, 118th Infantry. As such it formed part of the 30th Infantry Division during the Second World War. While in Federal Service its place was taken by a South Carolina State Guard company, since deactivated. A third unit, the Reserve Company, is composed of all former active members of the organization.

The museum is normally open every Monday evening; other nights as the needs demand.

LT. LOUIS F. OSTENDORFF

QUERIES

REGIMENT OF MOUNTED RIFLEMEN: Was the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, which was established in 1846, issued the same types of arms and equipment as the dragoon regiments of the period?

H. P.

REGIMENTAL HISTORIES OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMY: Could you tell me where I could find an official compilation of brief unit histories of the Austro-Hungarian army prior to 1918 comparable to Bredow and Wedel's *Rang- und Stammliste des deutschen Heeres* for the German army, or Chichester and Burges-Short's *Records and Badges* for the British Army?

F. P. T.

BENEDICT ARNOLD DOCUMENTS: I am trying to locate two documents relating to the operations of Benedict Arnold on Lake Champlain. The first is a rough drawing of a boat Arnold planned to build on the Lake, dated Chamblé, 1775; the second is an inventory or estimate of supplies for the galley *Washington*, drawn up between July and October, 1776. I have searched the obvious governmental repositories without success. Any information would be helpful.

M. V. B.

ARMY BANDS, WAR OF 1812: Were there any U. S. Army bands during the general period of 1812-1815? Musicians appear to have been attached to each company of a regiment; were these musicians consolidated into a drum corps?

C. G. C.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

GENERAL EISENHOWER AS SUPREME COMMANDER

BY MAJOR JOSEPH M. SCAMMELL

All of the books considered here* deal with the supreme command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower in the European Theater of Operations. Three are official reports of great soldiers. One is a commentary by the Procopius or chief military adviser of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SCAEF). Another is the diary of his Arrian, Captain Harry Butcher, USNR. Two are by newspaper men. One is a revealing biography. The last is a hybrid: good reporting marred by unhappy ventures into military criticism.

The higher direction of the war by the Allies was surprisingly good. General Marshall says that "it was the most complete unification of military effort ever achieved by two Allied nations." He contrasts it with the complete inability of the Axis Powers "to agree on a strategic overall plan for accom-

plishing a common objective." He speaks of the "serious diversions between Hitler and the General Staff" and calls the relief of von Brauschitsch the turning point in the war. General Eisenhower says that the United States and Great Britain worked as one nation, pooling their resources. They had a "well devised system of command" to which the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain made valuable contributions. "Under General Eisenhower," says Montgomery, "a strong, loyal team was quickly brought into being." In speaking of the system of conferences by the chief political leaders and the institution of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Ingersoll remarks that "there can be no doubt whatever that it represents the most effective example of management of allied armed forces in the history of warfare." Land, sea, and air forces were coordinated amazingly well.

It is not altogether true that the only thing we learn from history is that we learn nothing from history. When the shooting war was over in 1918 the war of ink began. There arose a vast polemical literature on the higher management of the war: Ludendorff, Jean de Pierrefeu, Liddell Hart, Sir Philip Gibbs, and Peter Wright are examples. In 1942 Major General Sir Frederick Maurice undertook a reappraisal of allied cooperation, 1914-1918, on the basis of offi-

**My Three Years With Eisenhower*, by Captain Harry C. Butcher. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1946. Pp. 911. \$5.00); *Top Secret*, by Ralph Ingersoll. (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company. 1946. Pp. 373. \$3.00); *Montgomery* by Alan Moorehead. (London: Hamish and Hamilton. 1946. Pp. 225. 15 shillings); *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff . . . 1943 1945* by General Marshall. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1945. Pp. 123. \$2.50); *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe . . . 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945* by General Eisenhower. (New York Publishing Company. 1946. Pp. 123. \$1.00); *Despatch Submitted by Field Marshall Montgomery* (New York: British Information Service. 1946. Pp. 76. Free). and *Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions* by Lt. Gen. Bedell Smith in *The Saturday Evening Post*, Vol. 218, June 8, 15, 22, 29 and July 6, 13, 1946.

cial reports, records, histories, and memoirs. He concluded that there had been cooperation from the beginning, and it developed slowly, in part because it was commonly believed that the war would be short, and in part because the politicians stood in fear of public opinion which was far ahead of them. The barriers were mainly political. Among the military cooperation was generally good. In 1939 and 1940 the British placed their military commander under the French high command; and when they sent a force to aid the Greeks it was placed under the Greek high command. The military and statesmen also had learned from experience.

"In the matter of command," says General Eisenhower, "all relationships between American and British forces were smooth and effective."

Command is defined in our field service regulations as "the authority which an individual in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment." General Eisenhower's directive stated: "You are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will exercise command" in accordance with the diagram which was furnished him. This diagram placed under his orders American Naval Forces and the commander-in-chief of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces. The forces under General Eisenhower's command numbered 90 divisions, some 120 ships of war, 5,000 merchant ships and 4,000 landing craft, as well as two tactical air forces. As SCAEF, General Eisenhower exercised his command as prescribed in our field service regulations:

"Whether the force is large or small, whether the functions of command are complex or simple, the commander must be the controlling head; his must be the master mind, and from him must flow the energy and the impulse which are to animate all under him."

In the words of Admiral Mahan, "The whole of military action is comprised in the one word 'unity'." Cohesion gives power to a military unit whether large or small. When we speak of the "destruction" of an armed force we mean that we disrupt its cohesion. Therefore, according to the American doctrine, "a wise and capable commander will see that the component groups of his unit are compatible." Our field service regulations go on to say that:

"Cohesion within a unit is promoted by good leadership, discipline, . . . and confidence and comradeship among its members."

The Prussian War Minister von Stein agreed with Admiral Lord Fisher that in war "it is *personality* that is required, even more than *brains*." A strong character, a strong will, and moral as well as physical courage are necessary. "A willingness to accept responsibility is the foremost trait of leadership." According to General Walter Bedell Smith, "the decision that sealed the final destruction of German forces in North-western Europe was made by General Eisenhower." Captain Butcher relates that the Supreme Commander showed him a draft for an announcement to be made in the event of the failure of the invasion. It was written on 5 June 1944, on the eve of the landing: It said, "If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt, it is mine alone." Before every amphibious operation, the General said, he prepared a similar statement. He who accepts responsibility for failure is entitled to full credit for success. In his report General Eisenhower takes responsibility for the decision to bomb French communication centers with attendant loss of French lives. He told the French people so in his proclamation.

AMERICAN AS A HOT DOG

Captain Butcher's diary tells of repeated clashes between Churchill and the Supreme

Commander. The struggle between these two strong-willed men went on from June through August and was renewed in October. In August, says Butcher, tears came into the old man's eyes because of the "bullying" attitude of the Americans. He even threatened to lay down the mantle of his high office. Always, General Eisenhower said "No."

In this dispute General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Bedell Smith, who is as American as a not dog, supported, and General Eisenhower's British Deputy Supreme Commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, opposed the Premier. If one British Admiral (Cunningham) opposed Eisenhower, two (Admirals Ramsay and Tennant) supported him. Admiral Ramsay admired Eisenhower's "stalwartness." Admiral Tennant called him "thoroughly magnificent in his resolution."

Mr. Ingersoll's version is that "General Eisenhower, of course, had nothing whatever to do with leading the invasion," because he was "wholly occupied in England with the statesman's part of the role of Supreme Commander." He had "become a political general." The term "political general" is unfair, because it has a connotation disparaging to an honorable soldier. "In seeking to win the war," he says, "the United States had no regard . . . for political considerations," but "the British always mix political with military motives." If this observation is sound, it means (according to all reputable writers on war and our own field service regulations) that the British understood the conduct of war better than we. It is not clear from the context in "Top Secret" that Mr. Ingersoll means to reflect on General Eisenhower when he says that there was no organized liaison with the Russians. To make the matter clear, it should be said that SCAEF's directive stated that "responsibility will rest with the Combined

Chiefs of Staff for supplying information relating to operations of the Forces of the U.S.S.R. for your guidance in timing your operations."

There was nothing mysterious or even complex about the manner in which the high command was organized and managed. It accorded with our FSR. "The initial assault was seen as a single battle," says General Eisenhower, "requiring the supervision of a single battle-line commander. All agreed on this necessity." Unified control was therefore delegated to Field Marshal Montgomery to 1 September when SCAEF assumed personal direction of the two Army Groups under Montgomery and Bradley respectively. The First Army Group (FUSAG), later the Twelfth Army Group, initially was inactive, and General Omar Bradley commanded the First U. S. Army immediately under Field Marshal Montgomery. In a similar manner, within the U. S. Forces control was by corps commanders until First U. S. Army arrived to take over.

Butcher and Bedell Smith tend to confirm Montgomery's words: the Field Marshal foresaw that the First and Ninth U. S. Armies, after the "Battle of the Bulge" would revert to Bradley's command. He wrote to Bradley saying that it was a great honor to have commanded them in action; that they had fought well; that it had been a pleasure to work with Hodges and Simpson; the corps commanders had been "magnificent." Later, the Ninth U. S. Army was placed under Montgomery to give weight enough to insure the success of the main effort. Says Montgomery: "The Ruler was enveloped. Ninth U. S. Army reverted to command." Ingersoll makes this a result of a sly trick on the part of General Bradley: "with authorization only from God and history" he stole an entire army from Montgomery. This version is not credible be-

cause "obedience and unity are only different manifestations of the same principle" and that principle is vital in war.

THE PLAN OF OPERATIONS

There were alternative plans for the overthrowing of the armed might of Nazi Germany in Western Europe. The master plan actually followed was called OVERLORD. It was supplemented by plan ANVIL, originally designed to be put into effect simultaneously with OVERLORD. It is not an easy task to evaluate this conception. We are still too close to the mountain to appreciate its majesty. The home bases of the larger part of the armed forces lay thousands of miles away. "Fortress Europa" was to be attacked from across the waters and enveloped on a gigantic scale. The main effort was to be made in a northeasterly direction from Normandy, keeping the sea on the left. A secondary effort was to be made from the Mediterranean, northward, keeping the mountains on the right. The difficulties in the way of successful execution were titanic.

Joint and combined planning by the British and Americans began in June 1942 and resulted in Plan OVERLORD, which was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in August 1943 and thereafter by the President and the British Premier. Bedell Smith reports that he "was amazed at the courage and imagination shown by the War Cabinet and all planning agencies." Bold and novel measures had been taken, but the British Chiefs of Staff wanted a stronger initial landing force. This was the view of the Supreme Commander; Montgomery, Admiral Ramsay, and Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory agreed. The initial plan called for an assault overseas by three divisions against a fortified coast defended by 36. There were 10 enemy divisions in the Normandy area

alone, and a total of 60 in Western Europe. The Report of the First U. S. Army gives the test of Plan NEPTUNE, the joint plan of the 21st Army Group, the Allied Naval Commander and the Allied Air Commander. It counted on the possible intervention of from 300 to 335 enemy naval craft, and by D plus 1, 1600 enemy air craft.

General Marshall states that the decisive factor in the success of OVERLORD was the air preparation. There was no effective air opposition to "our highly vulnerable initial landings." The accepted theory for landing on hostile shores is to avoid direct assault on a port or ports because they are usually strongly fortified and garrisoned, and to land on open beaches, preferably within striking distance of a suitable harbor. Fortified areas are avoided if the mission can be accomplished from other beaches. Weakly held areas are seized, bases established, and from them the invader maneuvers to seize ports for disembarking in strength and for supplying the armies. Rarely in history have landings succeeded at natural or artificial harbors. In 1694 the British attempted to seize Brest by direct assault. Caldwell speaks of this attempt as "one of the most fatuous and ignominious of British expeditions across the sea." Eisenhower and Montgomery agree that the Germans gave the French harbors first priority and they were impregnable to direct assault. The Germans were strongest where attack offered the greatest advantages.

In one sector of the American zone the troops landed some 1,000 yards from the beach intended. Because this was not a suitable landing place, little resistance was met and the troops were able to outflank the beach defenses. Much the same thing happened during an earlier Anglo-American landing on French soil at Louisbourg in 1758.

THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN

"Victory in this global war," says General Marshall, "depended on the successful execution of OVERLORD." His approval of the execution of that plan is plain. Seldom, if ever, in war has a plan been carried through more completely. It is a tribute both to the plan and to the commander that few decisions were called for once the plan was put into execution. General Bedell Smith describes six great decisions. Where others see decisions, Mr. Ingersoll sees only indecision.

"There are many good commanders in Europe," Napoleon once said, "but they see too many things." The Supreme Allied Commander kept his eye on the ball. "A commander must visualize the whole campaign." Yet flexibility is of paramount importance. "Maximum force must be concentrated against that objective . . . most vital to the success of the campaign." These are our official military precepts. These are the things that General Eisenhower did. The breakthrough and the maneuver that led to the final and total destruction of the German forces in the west were accomplished as laid down in FM 100-15, and in Plan OVERLORD. All are agreed on this except Ingersoll.

Throughout, both the plan and the commander stuck to essentials. "Without the Ruhr," says Bedell Smith, "the [German] army could not exist." Captain Butcher relates that General Eisenhower never once deviated from his opinion that the best means for destroying the German army was to strike at the Ruhr and the Saar, "throwing the great weight north of the Ruhr. All plans to end the war," he says, "depended on the capture of Antwerp, to feed the decisive northern flank. To this end supplies were diverted to the British Army Group and to Hodges' First U. S. Army. Bedell Smith

testifies that only if the decisive attack in the north went well would the secondary effort through the Frankfort corridor be pushed, to achieve "a wide, bold maneuver for decisive results."

Until he had finished "tidying up his administrative tail" and felt ready to throw the book at the Germans, Montgomery was about as brisk as a bee in a tar pot. In war as in literature, said Napoleon, every man has his own style. Montgomery's style was a sound and methodical style. General Eisenhower had a different style in war. Eisenhower sent Bradley a message through Montgomery, to take every chance and "border on the reckless." Montgomery was slow but sure, like Pedley's mare. When at last he got going he sent a similar message to one of his army commanders.

The plan was purposely made optimistic, according to the report of the First U. S. Army, to insure that the armies had a maximum of supply and transportation. During the initial phases of the assault progress fell far behind schedule, because of the tenacity of the enemy and bad weather. Nevertheless, Montgomery's armies reached the Seine a week ahead of schedule, D plus 90. By that time his armies had reached Antwerp. Meanwhile he had directed operations during two of the three decisive phases of the campaign. According to Eisenhower, at the "killing ground" of the Falaise-Argentan pocket he had destroyed about half of two German armies. Up to the Seine some 400,000 German troops were put out of action—more than the combined numbers of our Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves in the pre-war establishment (from p. 16). If, like the firefly, Patton went on wings of flame, Montgomery, like the bedbug that has no wings at all, got there just the same.

ANVIL HASTENS WAR'S END

"The art of distributing troops is the great art in war," said Napoleon, "a general always has enough troops, if he knows how to use them." Throughout the campaign the Supreme Commander sought to economize his forces in order to have a powerful striking force at the decisive point (north of the Ruhr) and, if possible, enough to justify a secondary effort to create a double envelopment. Operation ANVIL, says Bedell Smith, "advanced the end of the war by months."

The Supreme Commander, keeping his goal in mind, followed the book:

"Concentration of superior forces . . . at the decisive place and time and their employment in a decisive direction, creates conditions essential to victory."

"A defensive attitude may . . . be deliberately adopted as a temporary expedient . . . for the purpose of economizing forces on a front where a decision is not sought."

In the Ardennes sector risks were deliberately run. Only four divisions held a front of 75 miles where the Germans struck with 24. Here, says General Marshall, the line was stripped to make possible enough power at the points of attack. Eisenhower did what Miltiades did at Marathon and what Hannibal did at Cannae. Butcher relates that on 24 September 1944 "Ike finds that Bradley's forces are getting fearfully stretched south of Aachen and that we may get a nasty little 'Kasserine' if the enemy chooses the right place to concentrate his strength." On 14 December Eisenhower reported to Marshall that the British were disturbed by the American overextension. Bedell Smith tells of a conference between Eisenhower and Bradley on 16 September: "For the past week it had been clear that the Germans were up to something. . . . We are taking a cal-

culated risk in this area." Eisenhower disagreed with his staff and felt that the Germans might make a desperate attack. The Germans did in the Ardennes, on a larger scale, what they had done at Avranches.

The situations resembled in many ways the overrunning of the British Fifth Army in March 1918. As the front was not considered favorable for an offensive, the front of Gough's Army was thinly held. In both instances the Germans had the cover of fog. The Fifth Army was overrun. Haig placed it under Pétain and insisted that Foch should coordinate all forces.

General Marshall reports that "General Eisenhower reacted promptly and decisively." Bedell Smith says that Eisenhower's estimate of the situation and his swift decision to rush reinforcements to flanking key points saved the day. Both he and Butcher relate that the Supreme Commander said that he had not known we were in danger until he read it in the papers. Our generals lived up to their training:

"In spite of the most careful planning and anticipation, unexpected obstacles, frictions, and mistakes are common occurrences in battle. A commander must school himself to regard these events as commonplace and not permit them to frustrate him in the accomplishment of his mission."

Marshal Foch in a crisis found serenity through his conscience and his trust in God. General Hunter Liggett played solitaire. General Eisenhower read Western stories. Butcher relates that when Patton heard of the German offensive he was reported to have said, "Fine, we should open up and let 'em all the way to Paris. Then we'll saw 'em off at the base." The hinges of the salient held and the flanks by their resistance sucked more and more of the enemy's power out-

ward, blunting the spearhead. Patton swung his Third Army around and attacked northward while the First Army struck southward. In this operation the Germans lost 220,000 men, 1,400 tanks and guns, 4,192 pieces of heavy equipment, their last strategic reserve and their confidence.

"Eisenhower lost his nerve," says Ingersoll, "when Montgomery panicked." Montgomery "screamed" to Churchill. He "yelled" for help. He "screamed" and "yelled" twice in half a page; and after that we hear of "the high, rasping yelp of Montgomery." Ingersoll says that "We learned that the entire British Army was in retreat." Out of a clear sky Montgomery ordered the entire position abandoned and a retreat into the hills begun. This description doubtless refers to the withdrawal of the 7th Armored Division and the 106th Division from the St. Vith area into the critical Monschau area which had been organized for defense, and ordering the British XXX Corps to block the crossings of the Meuse. Mr. Ingersoll speaks of the dislocation of the plans of the Allies by this offensive. Bedell Smith says that "the plans were little affected by the attack."

Then "Gideon came to the Jordan and passed over, he, and the three hundred men that were with him, faint, yet pursuing." The capture of the Remagen bridge, says General Marshall, was exploited "with direct orders from General Eisenhower." Captain Butcher tells how the news came to the Supreme Commander. He was called to the telephone and was heard to say, "Brad, that's wonderful, sure, get right on across with everything you've got. . . . It's the best break we've had. . . ."

"To hell with the planners. Sure, go on, Brad, and I'll give you everything we got to hold that bridgehead."

Says Captain Butcher, "As usual, they were in quick and complete agreement."

The maneuver from the Remagen bridgehead was promptly decided. After their failure in the "Battle of the Bulge" the Nazis crowded a great part of their forces into the Ruhr area. They had foreseen the probability of a double envelopment, and they massed troops along the line of the Sieg. But the Supreme Commander launched a wide turning movement. Like Bedford Forrest before Murfreesboro, he had not come there to do a half way job. Within three weeks the Allies captured a million prisoners. What followed was in effect a pursuit on the greatest scale in history. It was more like a rabbit drive than a military operation.

MENE, MENE, TEKEL UPHARSIN

It would take a seer to assess the value to future historians of these reports, this diary, this biography, this critique, and this diatribe. An official report's value lies in the integrity and moral courage of those who accept responsibility for the official version.

In the three official reports under consideration disabilities inherent in them are honestly recognized. General Marshall sums up his sources, confesses their incompleteness, and tells us who did his research and editing. Eisenhower does much the same: his report is based in contemporary reports, often fragmentary or obscure. He leaves the final verdict to historians who may have access to fuller documentation and have the advantage of perspective. Montgomery's Despatch is a forthright soldierly report in simple language. Thus, as official reports go, these are exceptionally trustworthy.

Because the Americans sometimes lagged in making policy decisions and the British usually knew what they wanted, because the British were adept at working through the committee system and we were inept at it

and untrained in administration, because the British had a flexible system of selection and promotion and we a rigid, slow and cumbersome system, the British derived great advantages at our expense. However, this is not evidence that the British were disinclined to cooperate. Apparently, Mr. Ingersoll developed strong antipathies that warped his judgment and even led him into downright misstatements, as that "In matters touching the European Theater, the British had a 100 per cent airtight, hermetically sealed monopoly on intelligence about the enemy." The reviewer served on General Devers' staff (European Theater of Operations, U.S.A., called "ETOUSA") and on the staff of "COSSAC" in an intelligence group. The cooperation of all British sources of information was complete.

Much more attention than it deserves has been given Ingersoll's book, only because already it has done great mischief. Except for this, emphasis would have been placed on General Marshall's report. It is a document of high value, not merely because it places our far-flung military operations in perspective, but because of its statesmanlike character. The introduction and the concluding section "For the Common Defense" should be pondered by every citizen and made known to future citizens in all our schools.

BOOK REVIEWS

Population and Peace in the Pacific, by Warren Thompson. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1946. Pp. 397. \$3.75.)

Some day, I think, some one will write a simple and direct book which will show that our preoccupation with problems about ideologies, even when that preoccupation is continued in good faith, is comparable to the examination of only the surface of a river suspected of being contaminated. For it can be demonstrated, I suspect, that the divergent ideologies which have been and are being blessed or damned as being the highest expressions of man's nobility or the lowest form of

his debasement are but the surface manifestations of the tremendous, slow, irresistible tensions and strains and stresses engendered within the masses of the world's population.

Until such a work is written, however, I submit that *Population and Peace in the Pacific* will be considered one of the important steps taken in that direction. It is an attempt on the part of the author to demonstrate the bearing of the problems of population upon the question of peace. I say attempt with no thought of belittling the effort, for it seems to me that Mr. Thompson, in his three hundred sixty-one pages of text and his five hundred two quoted sources, has succeeded admirably. His arguments, from a logical point of view, seem to be sound and valid; the same arguments, from the point of view of their content, are convincing and, to me at least, acceptable.

He presents statistical information on birth and death rates, on population gains and losses, and on the extraneous factors affecting those things in such a way as to make clear and unquestionable their interrelationship. He evaluates his sources as he quotes them.

The book has an additional value, it seems to me, which lies in the fact that the author has approached his task with detachment and a freedom from ideological or nationalistic bias that is, at this time particularly, refreshing and encouraging. It is all the more so when one sees that the preface is dated in October, 1945, for this means that the greater part of the task of organizing the book must have been done while the war was in progress—under no circumstances a time for coldness or dispassion.

One of his examples is a perfect case in point. In speaking of the development of mandated islands he contrasts the attitude and the methods of the Australians and the Japanese in those areas which they acquired almost a generation ago. In the Australian mandated New Guinea area—which includes for the purposes of his exposition New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland, and the northern Solomons—there were, in 1940, 270 000 acres of cultivated land. On this land, which represented 0.5% of the total area of the mandate, the population at work consisted of 339 whites, 99 Asiatics, 21 halfcastes, and 20,477 indentured natives. It will be seen that under such a system the production of the area is directly dependent upon whether or not the native wants to work and whether or not he will continue to be

amenable to persuasion in the matter of the indenture.

The Japanese, on the other hand, took a completely different course in the matter of developing the relatively small amount of land under their mandate. The area which they controlled, an amount less than one per cent of that in the New Guinea mandate, was actively farmed by some 70,000 Japanese who engaged in commercial farming—copra and sugar cane—as well as supplying most of their own food needs.

The thought has latterly been growing in my mind that it is impossible to think of population in anything but terms of 100,000, that curious symbol that has lost its cardinality and its numerosity—lost its quantitative nature entirely, in fact, in the process of becoming either the yardstick of the actuary or a vague catchword of the same kind as "54-40 or Fight" and "Remember the Maine."

It was with something akin to astonishment, then, that the data presented so ably by Mr. Thompson began to sink into my mind. For Mr. Thompson, in considering segments and blocks of the incredibly large populations of the Eastern Asiatic countries deals, hypothetically, with population shifts involving tens of millions of people.

The author deals with the various aspects of the different areas bordering upon the Pacific as they bear upon the population problem. His remarks on China and on her difficulty of organizing herself are interesting in view of the apparent course of events there, and he has some searching comments on the colonial policies in Thailand and in Java.

All in all, it is a valuable book. It will not be read for pleasure, nor will it so grip the reader that he will read it straight through. It will, however, prove to be an excellent reference and the able exposition of what should be an obvious argument—that since wars arise from one or another population imbalance, a study of population problems is a prerequisite to any bona fide proposal to abolish warfare.

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Gateway to Victory, by Capt. James W. Hamilton and 1st Lt. William J. Bolce, Jr. Foreword by General MacArthur (Stanford University Press, 1946. Pp. 220. \$3.00.)

Described on the jacket as "the wartime story of the San Francisco Army Port of Embarkation" (SFPOE), and as revealing for the first time "the complete, authentic, behind-the-scenes story" of the Port in World War II, this volume fails to live up to either promise. The authors, California newspapermen who as officers were assigned to SFPOE as historian and public relations officer respectively, have written a readable and interesting account of some of the less important activities of the Port. Starting with a history of Fort Mason from 1797 to the outbreak of war, the authors fill in sketchily the story of the growth of SFPOE to one of the largest ports in the country and the main port of supply for all forces in the Pacific. There are brief chapters on various phases of SFPOE's work, especially those that were unusual and dramatic, such as mail service, intelligence, blood donations, WAC's, shipment of animals, prisoners of war, and the return of soldiers from overseas. The result is a series of unrelated general chapters on different aspects of port operations, with emphasis on personal and "unusual" material having human interest value.

The reader will look in vain for a clear statement of the mission of the Port, which areas and commanders were supplied, exactly what supplies were sent, and in what quantity. The only specific area mentioned is the Southwest Pacific; other areas such as the Central and South Pacific are only hinted at. Supply operations are described as though they were conducted in a vacuum, without reference to the campaigns and bases they were supporting. The peculiar problems of Pacific supply never receive adequate treatment. Absence of ports at destination, the slow turn around time of vessels assigned to the theater, shortage of shipping space, accumulation of ships at destination due to lack of unloading and warehouse facilities (as at Noumea in October and November 1942, and at Manila in the spring of 1945), the special problems involved in supplying a theater predominantly tropical, with small natural resources, and with few transportation or communication facilities—all these things are barely touched on. It should be pointed out, however, that the volume includes a number of charts and tables which illustrate graphically some of the important accomplishments of

SFPOE and provide statistics on total tonnages, the number of troops embarked, types of cargo, etc. Unfortunately, these tables are not correlated to the text and are not developed beyond the explanation provided by the illustration itself. Had the authors taken the opportunity to go beyond the overall figures and rates given in the tables, the result might have been a more meaningful and useful explanation of the operations of SFPOE.

The authors' lack of knowledge about the theater SFPOE served is illustrated in the occasional references to operations. On page 168, the bases between Hawaii and Australia are described as seized. Actually, U. S. forces were sent there after negotiations with the governments concerned. In no case was an island "seized." On the same page, it is stated that late in December 1942, advances in New Guinea had made it possible to establish new bases at Trobiend [sic], Woodlark, and Long Islands. None of these bases were taken until the middle of 1943. The landings in New Britain are spoken of as occurring in 1942 (p. 169). The 43d Division is described as blazing "a smoking trail to eastern New Guinea" (p. 183), although it had been in only two operations up to that time, one of which had been unopposed. The authors' imagination traces the 43d Division "across a series of small atolls," despite the fact the division had never been on an atoll. General Richardson is described as commander in the Pacific Ocean Areas (p. 198), which he was not. General Gilbreath, SFPOE commander for three years, is described later as commanding troops and bases from New Zealand to the Solomons in an inexact statement of his duties and area of responsibility from where he "was moved to headquarters at Luzon as commander" (p. 198). Do the authors mean that Gilbreath commanded the forces on Luzon, or that he commanded the area? Actually he commanded neither.

There have appeared and will continue to appear a large number of books on World War II. A good many of them unfortunately, will shed no light on the American effort against Germany and Japan. This volume is one of these, and is a distinct disappointment to the serious student of the logistics of the Pacific War.

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One Damned Island After Another, by Clive Howard and Joe Whitley. (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press. 1946. Pp. 392. \$3.50.)

One Damned Island After Another is all the title implies, as seen from the vantage point of two Army reporters with the Seventh Air Force. Here is a good insight into the persistent question of who won the war, the Air Forces or those other hundreds of thousands of "ground-pounders" soldiers, Marines, and Navy men.

Co-authors Clive Howard and Joe Whitley make it clear that they didn't have much of a hand in putting Japan's wartime leaders in an early grave; they simply write about what happened and how it happened. They chronicle those stories from an island-hopping war that seldom reached print in America. They mix tales of bravery, bloody mistakes and grim, but dauntless, American humor and come up with a concoction to tickle the palate of the historian, the layman or the green soldier who spent months in "the States" before shipping out and wishing later that he could have spent more boring months in the safety of basic training.

"One Damned Island," Oahu, is where the story began, on December 7, 1941, when the Seventh's parent, Hawaiian Air Force, was taking some of the beating Japan's sneak-raiders gave America's "Pacific Paradise," and, at the same time, sweating out the arrival of a flight of unarmed B-17's from the mainland. The last "damned island" was Japan itself, where the authors beat a hasty retreat from the building's back door as General MacArthur came in at the front to establish his Tokyo headquarters.

Bombers and fighters of the Seventh were required to fly farther than any reasonable pilot ever expected to pull a mission. Most of them made it back to base; some didn't. But, from island to island, through Makin, Truk, Saipan and Tinian and many others, pilots always found runways ready to receive their weary planes.

From beginning to end, this official Seventh Air Force history gives facts, dates, names, together with more than a hundred pictures and what went on in the air and on the ground as the Pacific war progressed to "one damned island after another."

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The Canadian Army at War. From Pachino to Ortona: The Canadian Campaign in Sicily and Italy, 1943, published by Authority of the Minister of National Defense. With a Foreword by Lieutenant General J. C. Murchie, C.B., C.B.E., Chief of the General Staff, Canada. (Ottawa: King's Printer. 1946. Pp. 160. \$5.50.)

This small volume, which is modestly called a booklet by its editors, is the second of three in the *Canadian Army at War* series prepared by the Historical Section of the General Staff, Canadian Military Headquarters in Great Britain. The first volume dealt with "Canadians in Britain" and the third will treat of Canadian operations in Northwest Europe.

Just as this volume is more than a booklet, so it is also more than a cold military history. Through its pages there breathes a warmth of human feeling and experience which gives life to an otherwise technical account of military operations. The Historical Section, whose joint efforts are producing this series, gives evidence of having on its staff men trained not only in military science but also in that combined science and art of historical research and writing. The main contents comprise a condensed account of the Canadian Army's contributions to the Sicilian and Italian campaigns from its landings on the beaches of Southwest Sicily near Pachino in July 1943 to its digging in behind the Winter Line just beyond Ortona in January 1944. And between the descriptions of these two campaign terminals are the recitals of the successful assaults of the Dominion's troops against such obstacles as Leonforte, the hills before Aderno. Reggio and Aspromonte, Campobasso and the Upper Sangro, and finally Ortona and Point 59.

Yet the book is not all of battle and tactics, for weaving in and out of the stories of combat is the theme of the moods of men: restiveness in England, excitement at the prospects of action, fulsome praise for courageous Italian collabora-

tion, sorrow for the unavoidable destruction of towns, sympathy for the homeless refugees, discomforts in the heat and dust of Sicily's summer and in the rain and cold of Italy's eastern shore in winter.

There are other small defects which need to be noted briefly. The inset map (p. 29) shows American units of the 3rd Division landing on 10 July as far west as Agrigento, when none landed on that D-Day any farther than just west of Licata. Once the writers allowed their patriotic enthusiasm to carry them away from their usual sober historical accuracy when they exclaimed (p. 78) that "in the end no division in the Allied force made a larger contribution to the (Sicilian) victory than the 1st Canadian Division." When one considers the long and bloody combat of the British divisions on the Catania Plain and the heavy fighting falling to the lot of the American divisions in two-thirds of Sicily, particularly in central and northeastern Sicily, such a sweeping statement is likely to be challenged by the facts as well as by the men of some of the other divisions. The purpose of this series excuses the absence of footnotes, but it does not justify the omission of an index, especially when the cryptic table of contents contains no page references whatever.

The flaws are so few and minor, however, as to make it seem ungracious to even point them out. Moreover, they are greatly outweighed by the additional commendable features of well-chosen photographs and excellent reproductions of paintings and drawings. Altogether this series is a fine contribution to the history of World War II. The Canadian Historical Section overseas is to be congratulated on its work. The readers of the first two volumes will await eagerly the appearance of the third and last.

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Read Hanson Baldwin's review of *The Strance Alliance*, by John R. Deane, (New York: Viking Press. 1947. Pp. 344. \$3.75), in the Summer issue of MILITARY AFFAIRS. Mr. Deane as a Major General headed the U. S. Military Mission to Moscow, 1943-1945, and it is about his experiences during that crucial period that he writes. Mr. Baldwin, authority on military matters for the *New York Times* and for many years one of its most prominent editors, is eminently qualified to assay this book which deals with many problems of foremost interest today. (Mr. Baldwin is presently engaged in writing a history of World War II.)